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Memory Restored or Confabulated by
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by James E. Beaver**
Courts have established that when an eyewitness to an
event under litigation, who has suffered loss of memory as the
result of a physical blow, thereafter recovers his memory follow-
ing yet another physical blow, the witness is competent to testify
to the event.' Moreover, courts generally hold that an eyewit-
ness's memory can be refreshed-in or out of court-by use of
any device which will get the job done. As expressed by Judge
Kalodner: "Anything may in fact revive a memory: a song, a
scent, a photograph, an allusion, even a past statement known to
be false." Yet now, within the past months, at least four state
supreme courts have decided that when the refreshment is
accomplished by hypnosis, the hypnotized subject is an incom-
petent witness as to the areas explored under hypnosis."
Eyewitness testimony is not especially reliable in the best of
* The American Heritage Dictionary gives two definitions of "confabulate." The
first definition is "to chat; to talk informally." The second definition, and the definition
used in this article, is, "to replace fact with fantasy in memory." The word has been
adopted by psychiatrists and authorities with the second meaning in mind.
** Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. B.A., 1952, Wes-
leyan; J.D., 1958, University of Chicago. The author gratefully ackowledges the excellent
research and critical help of Mr. Gregory E. Gladnick and Mr. Brian E. Onorato, stu-
dents at the University of Puget Sound School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Carr v. State, 44 Ala. App. 40, 202 So. 2d 59 (1967); Eldridge v. Melcher,
226 Pa. Super. 381, 313 A.2d 750 (1973); Valente v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 108 R.I. 558,
277 A.2d 505 (1971).
2. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ch. XXVIII (3d ed 1940); Morgan, The Relation
Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 HAzv. L. REv. 712 (1927); Annot., 125
A.L.R. 19 (1940).
3. United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
941 (1949) (quoting United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329
'U.S. 806 (1947)). See also Nicoli v. Briggs, 83 F.2d 375, 378 (10th Cir. 1936); Jewett v.
United States, 15 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 1926); Gray v. United States, 14 F.2d 366, 367-
68 (8th Cir. 1926).
4. See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); People v. Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982); State v.
Mack, 292 S.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436
A.2d 170 (1981).
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circumstances. More than fifty years ago, Hutchins and Sles-
inger pointed out that excited utterances-generally admitted
under an exception to the hearsay rule-are specially fallible.'
As one example, in a classroom experiment it appeared that the
testimony of the most excited student was almost worthless,
while those who were only slightly stimulated emotionally scored
better than those left cold by their observations.' Indeed, there
are few if any sources of evidence so unreliable as human testi-
mony. Witnesses sometimes wilfully lie. Honest witnesses may
frequently err in observing events, in remembering their obser-
vations, and in communicating those memories to the trier of
fact. Trial judges and juries also are fallible in determining
(guessing) which, if any, of the several disagreeing witnesses has
reliably reported objective facts. These fallibilities are what
prompted Learned Hand, our wisest judge, to remark: "I must
say that, as a litigant I should dread a law suit beyond almost
anything short of sickness and death."'7 Authorities agree that
there is nothing more uncertain than human testimony8
This writer agrees with Edmund Burke:
In this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess, that we
are generally men of untaught feeling; that instead of casting
away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very consider-
able degree,. . . and the longer they have lasted, and the more
generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We
are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private
stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man
is small, and that the individuals would be better to avail
themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, and of
ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding
5. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L.
REv. 432 (1928).
6. Id. at 437. Most lawyers are aware of the problems inherent in our great reliance
on testimony of witnesses. See, e.g., D. GutrrMAcHa & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 31 (1952); J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 43, 52, 54-55, 81
(1966); R. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 141-54 (1936); J. WIGMORZ, THE
SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 386-87 (1937); Moore, Elements of Error in Testimony, 28
OR. L. REv. 293 (1949); Stewart, Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A Criticism of Pre-
sent Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1, 10-13.
7. L. HAND, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 LEc-
TURES ON LEGAL Topics 89, 105 (1926), quoted in Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death".
A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 546 (1951).
8. Carter says: "From my experience as a man, a lawyer, a prosecuting attorney and
a judge, I am compelled to say that the most uncertain thing I know of is human testi-
mony." A. CARTER, THE OLD COURT HOUSE: REMINISCENCES AND ANECDOTES OF THE
COURTS AND BAR AT CINCINATTI 144 (1880).
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general prejudices employ their sagacity to discover the latent
wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek,
and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the
prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat
of prejudice, and to leave nothing but the naked reason;
because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action
to that reason, and an affection which will give it permanence.'
Thus, whether out of habit or prejudice, courts often admit tes-
timony of previously hypnotized witnesses.
Yet something extraordinary is occurring. Appellate courts
in five states in the last sixteen months have overturned or
ignored earlier precedent in holding a witness whose memory
has been refreshed by hypnosis to be incompetent. These courts
are the California Supreme Court,10 the Minnesota Supreme
Court," the Arizona Supreme Court, 2  the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court,"3 and the Michigan Court of Appeals."
These courts uniformly consider that the deficiencies in pre-
viously hypnotized witnesses are hypersuggestibility and
hypercompliance.15 They perceive enormous danger that the
prospective witness may under hypnosis intercept and internal-
ize any suggestions about the desired answer." Prehypnotic
uncertainty, the thought continues, develops, in light of the hyp-
notic experience, into certitude, with the subject unaware of any
interjected suggestions or resulting confabulations. The honestly
held belief of the prospective witness cannot be undermined by
9. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 99-101 (1965).
10. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
11. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
12. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
13. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
14. People v. Gonzales, 118 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306, leave to appeal
granted, 412 Mich. 870 (1981).
15. E.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. at 228-29, 624 P.2d at 1279; People v. Gonzales,
108 Mich. App. at 151, 310 N.W.2d at 315; State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768-69; Com-
monwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. at 104, 436 A.2d at 174.
16. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. at 104, 436 A.2d at 174. In most cases
involving forensic hypnosis, the subject is aware that the reason for the hypnotic session
is an inability on his part to remember facts. "A subject's awareness of the purpose of
the hypnotic session, coupled with the hypersuggestibility which the subject experiences,
amounts to a situation fraught with unreliability." As Professor Diamond puts it "[T]he
hypnotically recalled memory is apt to be a mosaic of (1) appropriate actual events, (2)
entirely irrelevant actual events, (3) pure fantasy and (4) pure fantasized details supplied
to make a logical whole." Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis
on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 335 (1980).
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the most effective cross-examination. Several courts also have
noted that juries probably would attach undue weight to such
testimony.1" Justice Stanley Mosk for the California Supreme
Court concludes: "[T]he hypnotic process does more than permit
the witness to retrieve real but repressed memories. . . [I] t
actively contributes to the formation of pseudomemories, to the
witness' abiding belief in their veracity, and to the inability of
the witness (or anyone else) to distinguish between the two."'"
On the other hand, in the last twenty years, at least seven
states approved the admission of hypnotically induced testi-
mony, ascribing to the trier of fact the duty of weighing the
credit which should be attached to such testimony. " The first
task for a court or for a scholar is to find out the facts. The
second, and far the more difficult task, is to face the facts and
exclude hypnotically refreshed testimony.
This article, after examining the scientific basis of hypnosis,
concludes that previously hypnotized witnesses are incompetent
to testify concerning matters discussed under hypnosis. Unbi-
ased examination of scientific literature discloses that persons
under hypnosis are highly motivated to please the hypnotist and
therefore are likely to fantasize rather than accurately recall lost
memories. After hypnosis these false impressions are fixed as
true and the witness is unshakable on cross-examination.
Therefore, the McCormick relevancy test 2 0 is inadequate, and
hypnosis tainted testimony, like other scientific evidence, must
meet the stricter Frye standard before being presented to the
finder of fact. Hypnosis presently does not pass the Frye test.
However, even if it ever becomes reliable enough in the future to
pass that test, serious confrontation clause problems remain.
The logical appeal of the California Supreme Court in People v.
Shirley2 is overwhelming. A new rule of incompetence should be
17. E.g., Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. at 106, 436 A.2d at 175.
18. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 53, 641 P.2d at 795, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
19. Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Creamer v. State, 232
Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 2d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848
(1979); State v. Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 414 A.2d 240 (1980), vacated on other
grounds, 290 Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018 (1981); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d
302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d
414 (1978); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971).
20. The McCormick relevancy test refers to that test of the competence of scientific
evidence adopted in Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 949 (1969).
21. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133
(1982). But see. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
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recognized in the law of evidence.
I. THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE
Hypnotism has been the subject of much interest and spec-
ulation for well over two centuries, 2 though only recently among
trained scientists.28 In the past fifty years, scientists, psychia-
trists, psychologists, and researchers have lifted hypnosis from
the depths of superstition2 ' to the fields of experimental psy-
chology where they have applied "the manners of the labora-
tory"' and "the language of the polite science."'" Hypnosis is
now a recognized branch of psychology,27 and is utilized exten-
sively by psychiatrists and others in the treatment of mental
problems.28 Generally it has been used to uncover the sup-
pressed emotions and mental disturbances surrounding facts
brought forth from the subject during treatment.2" Tradition-
ally, the hypnotist has not been concerned with historical accu-
racy of information unearthed during hypnosis.30 The value of
hypnosis has been therapeutic and only recently has it been
viewed as a forensic aid.
22. See generally White, A Preface to a Theory of Hypnotism, 36 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 477 (1941).
23. Id.
24. At one time, hypnosis was the "province of nomadic faith healers, spiritualists,
and a wide variety of quacks." Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hyp-
nosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 313, 318 (1980). Various special powers
which have been attributed to witches and faith healers are probably related to the use
of hypnosis. 9 ENCYCLOPzD1A BRITANICA, Hypnosis, 134 (1975).
25. White, supra note 22.
26. Id.
27. In 1956, the American and British medical associations formally approved the
therapeutic use of hypnosis. The American Psychological Association followed suit in
1960 recognizing hypnosis as a branch of psychology. See E. HI.GARD, HYPNOTIC SUSCEP-
TmnLrry 4 (1965), cited in Comment, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by
Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REv. 1203, 1206 n.22 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Admissibility of
Testimony].
28. Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Courts, 27 INr'L J. CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 316 (1979).
29. Id.
30. For example, Freud believed adult seduction in childhood was the "etiological
factor" in hysteria among some of his patients. Through hypnotic age regression, these
patients relived their seductions dramatically. It was not until years later that Freud
realized the seductions relived under hypnosis accurately portrayed the various fantasies
of his patients, but historically were quite inaccurate. Orne, supra note 28, at 316. "Con-
sider, however, the catastrophe which would have resulted if Freud had acted upon his
patient's recollections and had urged the authorities to imprison the fathers of incest."
Id. at 316-17.
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No one is sure exactly what hypnosis is.31 Some researchers
define hypnosis in terms of the procedures the therapist uses to
induce the subject into a trancelike state.,32 Others have theo-
rized in terms of behavioral characteristics and view hypnosis as
effect oriented. A subject "behaves without the experience of
will or intention, without self-consciousness, and without the
subsequent memory which under the circumstances one would
expect," and "these changes in his behavior occur merely
because the hypnotist says so."" Professor Orne, a respected
expert, defines hypnosis as a "state or condition in which sub-
jects are able to respond to appropriate suggestions with distor-
tions of perceptions or memory.""' The diverse explanations for
the phenomenon exact one point: there is not as yet one univer-
sally accepted definition or theory as to its nature.
Professor Hilgard observed 5 several characteristics of sub-
jects within the hypnotic state: lack of initiative, selective atten-
tion, heightened fantasy production, distortions of reality, role
behavior, and amnesia concerning events ocurring during the
hypnotic trance.36 Hypnotists can employ a variety of proce-
dures to induce the hypnotic state. The hypnotist may relax the
subject through a series of suggestions designed progressively to
induce hypnosis.3 7 The success or failure of the various inducing
techniques38 is usually dependent upon the subject's hypno-
tizability and the rapport between the hypnotist and the
subject. 9
Whether hypnosis is a reliable method for accurately restor-
ing memories initially depends on whether there is any recall to
improve. The answer to this question depends upon the hypno-
31. See Burrows, Forensic Aspects of Hypnosis, 13 AusTL. J. OF FORENSIC SCI. 120
(1981); Comment, Admissibility of Testimony, supra note 27, at 1206; Comment, The
Probative Value of Testimony from the Hypnotically Refreshed Recollection, 14 AKRON
L. REV. 609, 610 (1981).
32. See, e.g., T. BARBER, HYPNOSIS: A SciENTIic APPROACH (1969), cited in Com-
ment, Admissibility of Testimony, supra note 27, at 1207.
33. White, supra note 22, at 503.
34. Orne, The Construct of Hypnosis: Implications of the Definition for Research
and Practice, 296 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 14, 19 (1977).
35. E. HILGARD, HYPNOTIC SuscErrmIrry (1965), cited in Comment, Admissibility
of Testimony, supra note 27, at 1206.
36. Id. at 6-10.
37. Id. at 22.
38. The wide variety of inducing techniques is detailed in L. CHERTOK, HYPNOSIS
101-10 (D. Graham trans. 1966), cited in Comment, Admissibility of Testimony, supra
note 27, at 1208.
39. 9 ENCYCLOPSDIA BRITANNICA, Hypnosis, 133, 135-36 (15th ed. 1975).
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tist's theory of how memory works and how memories are stored
and recalled.
Some experts believe the human brain operates as a "vide-
orecorder," permanently recording and storing our perceptions. 40
This "exact copy"'41 theory is premised upon Wilder Penfield's
surgical work on epileptics during the 1940's.4 Penfield removed
damaged portions of his patient's brain while his patient was
awake. To facilitate pinpointing the damaged areas, Penfield
stimulated the brain surface with a light electric current. This
weak simulation caused some of his patients to reexperience
long forgotten events.'3 These revived memories" relived by his
patients led Penfield to conclude that the human brain records
past experiences and impressions as a tape recorder would
record a voice."1 Penfield's research implies that if the impres-
sions and sensations are all stored in the brain, then a complete,
actual recording of a particular event may be brought out to the
conscious state. Hypnosis, as perceived by many of its practi-
tioners, is a means or tool used to extract an intact memory sub-
40. Loftus & Loftus, On the Permanence of Stored Information in the Human
Brain, 35 Au. PSYCHOLoGxsT 409, 412 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Loftus]. Dr. Martin
Reiser, director of the Law Enforcement Hypnosis Institute of Los Angeles, author of the
Handbook of Investigative Hypnosis, and director of the Behavorial Science Services for
the Los Angeles Police Department, is a proponent of this memory theory. According to
Dr. Reiser: "The brain functions much like a high fidelity recorder, putting on tape, as it
were, every experience from the time of birth, possibly even before birth, and that these
experiences and associated feelings are available for replay today in as vivid form as
when they first occurred." M. Raam, HANDBOOK OF INvESTIGATIW HYPNOSIS 8 (1980),
cited in People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 59 n.36, 641 P.2d 775, 799 n.36, 181 Cal. Rptr.
243, 267 n.36, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
41. Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions of Eyewitness Memory, 27 INT'L J. OF
CuNmCAL & EXPUMEsNTAL HYPOiSS 437 (1979). "An 'exact copy' theory of memory...
posits that once information is encoded, it is represented veridically and is unaffected by
subsequent inputs." Id.
42. Penfield & Perot, The Brain's Record of Auditory and Visual Experience, 86
BRAIN 595 (1963), cited in Loftus, supra note 40, at 420.
43. Loftus, supra note 40, at 411.
44. For example, Loftus describes a Penfield experiment-
One of Penfield's patients was a young woman. As the stimulating electrode
touched a spot on her temporal lobe, she cried out. "I think I heard a mother
calling her little boy somewhere. It seemed to be something that happened
years ago ... in the neighborhood where I live." Then the electrode was
moved a little bit and she said, "I hear voices. It is late at night, around the
.carnival somewhere--some sort of traveling circus. I just saw lots of big wag-
ons that they use to haul animals in."
Loftus, supra note 40, at 411.
45. See id.
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merged within the deep recesses of the brain.46 Recent research,
however, seriously erodes a "videorecorder" model of memory. 7
Studies now indicate that the brain does not permanently
store information. Rather, current scientific thought favors the
view that memory is "reconstructive," and therefore the memory
tends to restructure an event based on all the information avail-
able coupled with the person's general experience." A "recon-
structive" theory of memory posits that memory in any situation
will reconstruct a given event which may not correspond with
the actual happening.49 Thus, original stored information can be
46. Penfield's own writings profess a belief that information is permanently stamped
upon the brain. "The imprint, or record, is a trail of facilitation of neuronal connections
that can be followed again by an electric current many years later with no loss of detail,
as though a tape recorder had been receiving it all." Id. (quoting Penfield, Conscious-
ness, Memory, and Man's Conditioned Reflexes, in ON THE BIOLOGY OF LEARNING 165
(K. Pribram ed. 1969)).
47. See, e.g., Putnam, supra note 41. For a typical example of expert testimony
implicitly espousing the videorecorder theory see Sannito & Mueller, The Use of Hypno-
sis in a Double Manslaughter Defense, TRIAL DIPLOMACY, Fall 1980, at 30. Dr. Sannito
testified for the defense at a double manslaughter trial in which the defendant had been
hypnotized prior to trial: "In case [defendant] would have blocked out this event, if
something happened, like if he hit the people and he knew about it ahead of time and it
was blocked out of his consciousness, it would have come out if he were in a trance. He
was in a trance and it did not come out." Id. at 34. On recross-examination, Dr. Sannito
reiterated his earlier testimony. "But under hypnosis, that was the whole idea of hypno-
sis, that if it's repressed, it will come out if he's in a trance." Id. Dr. Sannito was asked
whether a person having an interest in repressing a traumatic event might not release all
of the perceptions, thus selectively forgetting. He responded, "No. In my opinion, no.
Now, if you're talking about a very mild trance, that's very possible. If we're talking
about a very, very deep trance, like the one [defendant] experienced, no way." Id. at 35.
48. Penfield's findings showed very limited memory recovery by electrode stimula-
tion. Out of 1,132 patients, only 40 cases, 3.5%, indicated possible memory recovery.
Loftus, supra note 40, at 413. Penfield, however, reported "experimental responses" in
40 cases when the electrode was applied to the cortex of the temporal lobe. This region,
however, was explored in but 520 patients. Loftus duly notes this constitutes responses
from 7.7% of the group tested. Id. On the other hand, the results and the implications of
Penfield's study are at best sketchy. Loftus, in an informal survey, found that 84% of
the psychologists surveyed indicated a belief in the "videorecorder" model. Id. at 410. A
smaller percentage, 69 %, of non-psychologists, indicated a belief in the same model. Id.
49. See, e.g., E. Lorrus, Evwrrzss TESTIMONY (1979); Loftus, supra note 40, at
413.
The first notion to get rid of is that memory is primarily or literally reduplica-
tive, or reproductive. . . .In fact, if we consider evidence rather than presup-
position, remembering appears to be far more decisively an affair of construc-
tion rather than one of mere reproduction .... Remembering is not the re-
excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces. It is an imagi-
native reconstruction, or construction, built out of the relation of our attitude
towards a whole active mass of organized past reactions or experiences.
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 58, 641 P.2d 775, 798-99, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 267 (quot-
ing F.C. BARTLErr, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
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lost and replaced with totally inaccurate information.50
A recent study5 illustrates the problems this poses for hyp-
notically influenced testimony. The study made several findings
as to the reliability of information recalled in the hypnotic state:
individuals under hypnosis related more incorrect information in
response to leading questions than individuals in the normal
awake state; 2 the hypnotized subjects were confident in their
recollections even though the information recalled was totally
wrong;"3 the memory of a subject under hypnosis was easier to
influence than that of a normal unhypnotized subject. 4
In accord with this study, other studies have demonstrated
that recall under hypnosis is no better than in the normal awake
state. 55 One early study by Huse failed to demonstrate any mea-
213 (1932, reprinted 1964)), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 133 (1982).
50. The Loftus experiment indicated that substitution occurred. A substitutional
hypothesis posits that postperceptual information does replace original information and
that, in the process, "the original information is forever banished from the subject's
memory." Loftus, supra note 40, at 416. Nevertheless, the possibility of a theory of coex-
istence still exists; Loftus concedes that it is virtually impossible. to reject the "vide-
orecorder" hypothesis because failing to "find one member of a coexisting pair" does not
necessarily mean that the other member does not exist. Id. at 416-17. "Exact copy" theo-
rists might argue that Loftus's experiments do not dig deep enough and that the original
information has not vanished, the subjects were simply unable to retrieve it. Id. Circum-
stantially, however, Loftus argues that the experiments were rigorous enough so that "for
all practical purposes, it [original information] has vanished." Id. at 417.
51. Id. at 418-19. "The implication of the notion of nonpermanent memory is that it
should give pause to all who rely on obtaining a 'truthful' version of an event from some-
one who experienced that event in the past." Id. at 419. "The net result of these studies
is a strong suspicion that substitution has occurred-that the misleading information has
irrevocably replaced the original information in the subject's brain." Id. at 418. Thus,
hypnosis may, in some cases, accurately retrieve a memory which has already substituted
false information for information which was lost.
52. Putnam, supra note 41, at 446. In Putnam's study, after subjects viewed a colli-
sion between a bicycle and an auto, subjects were asked a series of sixteen questions, six
of which were phrased to suggest a particular response (e.g., "Did you see the stop sign?"
instead of "Did you see a stop sign?"). Id. at 441. Subjects made more errors answering
the suggestive questions under hypnosis than they did when not hypnotized. Id. at 444.
There was no measurable difference in accuracy between the hypnotized and unhypno-
tized concerning answers to the objective questions. Id. at 445.
53. Id. at 444. Putnam found hypnotized subjects were just as confident as
nonhypnotized subjects who made fewer errors.
54. Id. Hypnotized subjects felt they were more accurate in their responses under
hypnosis than they were in the normal waking state. Id. at 444.
55. Id. at 446. One commentator suggests that these recent studies contain an
implicit message that if hypnotic procedures could be improved upon, the problem of
inaccurate recall would be substantially diminished. See Comment, Admissibility of Tes-
timony, supra note 27, at 1213. Putnam's study, however, pinpoints the incredible result
of simply replacing one seemingly innocuous word for another in questions asked hypno-
tized subjects: "It is impotant to note that five of the leading questions consisted of
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surable increased recall for paired nonsense syllables. 6 More
recent studies, however, demonstrate mixed results but the
majority of studies indicate no increased recall.5 7 Very early
merely changing the article 'a' to 'the', but this rather subtle change had substantial
effects." Putnam, supra note 41, at 444. Additionally, hypnotists do not consciously dis-
tort a witness's memory; rather, the process of "cueing" the hypnotized subject to answer
a question is generally unintentional. Affidavit of Martin T. Orne, M.D., Ph.D., at 15,
Quaglino v. California, 439 U.S. 875 (1978)(leave to file affidavit in petition for cert.
granted, but cert. denied) [hereinafter cited as Orne Affidavit]; Diamond, supra note 16,
at 333. Apparently, the subjects in Putnam's study could not distinguish between what
actually occurred in the accident scenes and what subsequently was suggested to have
occurred. Putnam, supra note 41, at 445. The "exact copy" theory posits that the origi-
nal memory is stored and supposedly cannot be altered by subsequent inputs. Id. at 437.
Putnam's study conclusively shows that the memory can be tampered with simply by
replacing the article "a" with "the." Id. at 444.
56. Huse, Does the Hypnotic Trance Favor the Recall of Faint Memories?, 13 Bsrr-
ISH J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 519 (1930). Additionally, Eyesenck reached the same
conclusion with playing cards. Eyesenck, An Experimental Study of the Improvement of
Mental and Physical Functions in the Hypnotic State, 18 J. MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY 304
(1941).
57. These studies have dealt with certain types of information learned in the normal
waking state than later recalled in the hypnotic state. Putnam, in his study, found no
measurable difference in recall for objective questions between hypnotized and unhypno-
tized subjects. Putnam, supra note 41, at 445. He found this puzzling in view of other
reports of increased recall from actual police investigations. But see Kroger & Douce,
Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 358
(1979) (60% increase in new information recalled through hypnosis). The study, how-
ever, concedes that it is unknown how much of the 60% increase in information was
accurate. Only a small amount of the information was corroborated, but these corrobo-
rations aided in criminal convictions. Id. at 358. Kroger and Douce contend that inde-
pendent corroboration "is absolutely essential" to determine the accuracy and, ulti-
mately, the utility of information retrieved by hypnosis. Id. at 370-71. See also Shaefer &
Rubio, Hypnosis and the Recall of Witnesses, 29 INT'L. J. CLINICAL & GEN. PSYCHOLOGY
81 (1978) (10 out of 13 cases were substantially aided by information elicited under hyp-
nosis). Like Kroger and Douce, Shaefer and Rubio contend that any evidence gathered
from hypnosis must be backed up by other incontrovertible facts which logically lead to
other known facts not elicited from hypnosis. Thus, the authors appear to utilize hypno-
sis as a supplementary device. Id. at 83.
A 1974 study, however, indicates enhanced recall of word lists. Krauss, Katzell &
Krauss, Effect of Hypnotic Time Distortions Upon Free-Recall Learning, 83 J. ABNOR-
MAL PSYCHOLOGY 140 (1974). Nevertheless, the authors admit that "the methodology of
this study is not above reproach." Id. at 144. Contradicting the Krauss study, other
recent experiments show no advanced recall in the hypnotic state. See Dahanens, The
Effects of Several Hypnotic and Waking Suggestions on the Recall of Nonsense and
Contextual Material, 33 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INC. 5546 (1972) (nonsense syllables
and prose passage learned one week prior to hypnotic induction); Johnson, Hypnotic
Time Distortion and the Enhancement of Learning: New Data Pertinent to the Krauss-
Katzell-Krauss Experiment, 19 AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 98 (1976) (word lists learned
in hypnotic time distortion experiment); Putnam, supra note 41 (no apparent increase in
recall in response to objective questions); Salzberg & DePiano, Hypnotizability and
Task Motivating Suggestions: A Further Look at How They Affect Performance, 28
INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 261 (1980) (word lists).
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studies showed an increased recall for childhood memories' s and
poems59 but these studies are considered ancient and therefore
of little value because experimental methodologies have changed
so drastically. As these studies indicate, much dispute remains
about hypnosis as a reliable method of accurately restoring one's
memory. The authorities do, however, unanimously agree with
Orne that information recalled in the hypnotic state may not be
reliable." Some conclusions may be drawn, though they are not
necessarily immutable.
Two characteristics of the hypnotic state are hypersugges-
tibility and hypercompliance. Thus, a subject is not only more
susceptible and easily influenced, but more willing to please
others, especially the hypnotist.1  Additionally, a subject can
wilfully lie under hypnosis,6s and the process of "cueing" a sub-
58. Comment, Admissibility of Testimony, supra note 27, at 1210 (citing Young, An
Experimental Study of Mental and Physical Functions in the Normal and Hypnotic
States: Additional Results, 37 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 345, 349-51 (1926)).
59. Rosenthal, Hypnotic Recall of Material Learned Under Anxiety and Non-anxi-
ety Producing Conditions, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 369 (1944) (poems learned
within 24 hours of hypnosis); Stalnaker & Riddle, The Effect of Hypnosis on Long
Delayed Recall, 8 J. GEN. PSYCHOLOGY 429 (1932) (poems learned at least one year prior
to hypnotic recall experiment).
60. A recent study by Barber sheds serious doubt on Rosenthal's findings. Barber &
Calverly, Effects on Recall of Hypnotic Induction, Motivational Suggestions and Sug-
gested Regression: A Methodological and Experimental Analysis, 71 J. ABNORMAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 169 (1966). Similarly, Orne closely checked Stalnaker and Riddle's study and
findings. "In hypnosis these subjects appeared to be able to recite the poem far more
easily with far better recall than in the wake state. Careful analysis, however, showed
that there was only little additional recall; rather a pronounced tendency to confabulate,
i.e., make up, superficially appropriate sections for the words that could not be recalled."
Orne Affidavit, supra note 55, at 8, 9. The study establishes (1) a modest increase in
recall and (2) a tendency to confabulate. Id.
61. Worthington, The Use in Court of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 27 INT'L
J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 402, 413-14 (1979). In fact, Orne says a witness's
testimony to a "memory" retrieved under hypnosis is "infinitely less reliable" than poly-
graph results which are nearly universally excluded. See State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764,
768 n.7 (Minn. 1980).
62. Levitt, The Use of Hypnosis to "Freshen" the Memory of Witnesses or Victims,
TRIAL, April 1981, at 56. Dr. Levitt is Director of Psychology of the Department of Psy-
chiatry, Professor of Clinical Psychology at Indiana University School of Medicine, and
President of the Division of Psychological Hypnosis of the American Psychological Asso-
ciation. See Diamond, supra note 16, at 333.
63. See generally Orne, supra note 28. Particularly appalling is State v. Douglas,
No. 692-77 (Union County, N.J., vacated, May 23, 1978), reported by Dr. Orne. In this
case, a woman was abducted by two black men who jumped into her car at a stop light.
At gunpoint, the abductors forced the woman to drive to the outskirts of town where one
abductor attempted to forcibly rape her. She averted this by telling her abductors she
was pregnant. They took her purse, made her leave her car, and threatened her if she
reported the events to the police. She nevertheless did report the events and was shown
166 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 6:155
ject (suggesting a particular answer) is generally outside the
awareness of either hypnotist or subject.64 The memory recalled
under hypnosis is not necessarily an accurate "replay," but can
be a combination of "(1) appropriate actual events, (2) entirely
irrelevant actual events, (3) pure fantasy, and (4) fantasized
details supplied to make a logical whole." 5
Although studies show a modest increase in recalled infor-
mation, there also is an increased tendency to confabulate." A
hypnotized subject also is convinced of the accuracy of his new
memory, even though unclear and unsure about an event before
hypnosis.6 7 Without independent corroboration, neither the sub-
ject nor the hypnotist can distinguish truth or falsehood, fact or
fancy.8 For instance, the common hypnotic technique of age
regression, utilized with witnesses to recall past events, can also
be used to advance the subject to the year 2000. The subject, in
a deep trance, will give a vivid and compelling description of
new, but as yet unseen, marvels. 9 Moreover, hypnosis, even
without confabulation and suggestion, could extract an actual
various mug shots. She identified one of her abductors and picked out another as a look-
alike. Subsequent to these events, she received threatening notes, presumably from her
abductors. She underwent hypnosis for the purpose of furthering the investigation.
While in the hypnotic trance, she identified the look-alike as her other abductor. Subse-
quently, the district attorney, though originally skeptical of her story, was convinced by
the hypnosis session and proceeded in the filing of the charges. Still, the district attorney
was struck by the peculiarity of the handwriting of the threatening notes the victim had
received. The notes were submitted to a handwriting expert who identified the writing as
that of the victim who filed the charges! When confronted with this evidence, she con-
fessed that none of the events had occurred, nor had she ever met the two men she
accused. The complaint was made with the hope of rekindling the interest of her hus-
band who was actively seeking divorce. Id. at 333-34.
64. All of the scientific studies and experts seem to agree with this assertion. See
Orne Affidavit, supra note 55, at 15; Diamond, supra note 16, at 333; Levitt, supra note
62, at 57; Loftus, supra note 40, at 414; Putnam, supra note 41, at 439.
65. Diamond, supra note 16, at 335. See generally Orne Affidavit, supra note 55;
Orne, supra note 28.
66. See supra note 57; Orne Affidavit, supra note 55, at 9; Diamond, supra note 16,
at 332; Orne, supra note 28, at 319.
67. Levitt, supra note 62, at 57, states: "The witness's testimony on the stand will
be unshakeable, he or she has become literally immune to cross-examination." See Dia-
mond, supra note 16, at 339-40; Orne, supra note 28, at 320; Worthington, supra note 61,
at 413-14.
68. Orne Affidavit, supra note 55, at 10; Diamond, supra note 16, at 337. See the
resolution passed by both the Society for Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis and the
International Society of Hypnosis, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNoSIS 452,
453 (1979).
69. Rubenstein & Neuman, The Living Out of "Future" Experiences Under Hyp-
nosis, 119 SCIENCE 472-73 (1954). "All of our subjects live out 'future' events in their
lives with equal verisimilitude to their accounts of the past." Id. at 473.
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false memory. 70 Thus, the modern reconstructive theory of mem-
ory poses serious problems for the forensic use of hypnosis.
By no means is the research conclusive; in fact, it has only
begun. As Putnam correctly notes, there are no rigorous scien-
tific studies concerning the reliability of information recalled
from emotionally traumatized victims.7 1 Hypnosis may eventu-
ally be effective in this narrow area. But hypnosis as a new
forensic aid has not been sufficiently tested, and the question as
to whether hypnosis is a reliable means for accurately restoring
memories, on the scientific front is as yet unresolved. The evi-
dence to date clearly indicates that many researchers and
experts do not believe hypnosis has yet been shown to be
reliable.
II. THE CASE LAW
Hypnotism traces its roots to primitive times.7 2 Its discov-
ery, however, is credited to Franz Mesmer who, in the eight-
eenth century, cured patients through what he called "animal
magnetism" and "artificial somnambulism."73 Though generally
ignored for 100 years, 4 in 1880 Sigmund Freud sparked renewed
scientific interest by endorsing its clinical use.7 5 The develop-
ment of ether anesthesia and Freud's subsequent rejection of
hypnosis in favor of psychoanalytic free association dampened
further development of use of hypnosis. 76 World War II brought
renewed interest,7 7 and in 1958, the American Medical Associa-
tion officially endorsed the clinical use of hypnosis. Similarly,
like the acceptance of the clinical use of hypnosis by the medical
70. See Loftus, supra note 40; Putnam, supra note 41.
71. Putnam, supra note 41.
72. Hypnosis was used in many religious ceremonies. M. TITELBAUM, HYPNOSIS
INDUCTION TECHNIQUES 3 (1963).
73. Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evi-
dence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 568 (1977).
74. Eighteenth century interest in hypnosis ended abruptly when the French Royal
Commission denounced Mesmer as a charlatan. RAPPORT DES COMMISSAIRES CHARG9S
PAR LE Roi, DE L'EXAMEN Du MAGNEISME ANIMAL 64 (Paris 1784), cited in Diamond,
supra note 16, at 318 n.20.
75. 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, Hypnosis, 133, 134 (15th ed. 1975).
76. Diamond, supra note 16, at 318-19.
77. Id. at 320. A 1972 bibliography contains over 1000 references to scientific publi-
cations of hypnosis research, most being post-World War II. HYPNOSIS RESEARCH DEVEL-
OPMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 587 (E. Fromm & R. Shor eds. 1982).
78. Council on Mental Health, Medical Uses of Hypnosis, 168 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
186 (1958).
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community, the forensic use of hypnosis and its acceptance by
the judicial community is a fairly recent phenomenon. 79
Hypnotism is undoubtedly regarded in the scientific com-
munity as a therapeutic tool. As two highly respected authors
put it: "Hypnosis is an altered state of consciousness. It is char-
acterized by an increased ability to produce desirable changes in
habit patterns, motivations, self-image, and life-style. Altera-
tions may be produced in physiological functions, such as pain
"80
The judiciary has confronted the evidentiary use of hypno-
sis in two general areas:81 pretrial hypnosis of the criminal
defendant 2 and pretrial hypnosis of other witnesses.83 Courts
have held that defendants have a right to be hypnotized to assist
counsel in the preparation of their defense,8 4 but the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority excludes as competent evidence, extraju-
dicial exculpatory statements made by defendants"5 or third per-
79. The first reported case to deal with the issue of hypnosis was People v. Ebanks,
117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897). The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court
which held: "The law of the United States does not recognize hypnotism." Id. at 665, 49
P. at 1053. It was not until 1968, 71 years later, that a court held admissible testimony
from a witness hypnotized before trial. See Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d
302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
80. H. CRASILNECK & J. HALL, CLINICAL HYPNOSIS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 1,
323 (1975). These authors announce that hypnosis is now the initial treatment of choice
to control smoking, excessive eating, "recovery of memory in traumatic neuroses," and in
some psychosomatic and dermatological cases. Id. at 2. These authors also characterize
hypnosis as a "clinical art." Id. at 323.
81. Only two reported cases have been found permitting a person to testify in front
of the jury while hypnotized. State v. Nebb, No. 39,540 (Ohio Com. PI., Franklin County,
May 28, 1962) (parties stipulated to admissibility), reported in, Dilloff, The Admissibil-
ity of Hypnotically Aided Testimony, 4 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 1, 12 (1977); Regina v. Pitt, 68
D.L.R.2d 513 (1968), reported in, 15 McGn.L L.J. 189 (1969). Besides Nebb and Pitt, all
cases found concern the pretrial hypnosis of a witness or a defendant.
82. The issue of hypnosis normally arises in criminal trials. The earliest case is State
v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599, 50 S.E. 283 (1905). The analysis of the cases in this article does
not differentiate between non-victims and victims of crimes who are hypnotized and sub-
sequently testify in their alleged assailants' trials because the cases analyze the admissi-
bility question similarly in each instance. Compare, Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230,
246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969) (victim/witness), with State v.
Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971)(eyewitness).
83. Only four civil cases have been found dealing directly with the issue of hypnosis
to refresh and to afford witness testimony: Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th
Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); Connolly v.
Farmer, 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973); Lemieux v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 214, 644 P.2d
1300 (1982). For an excellent synopsis of the more general case law in the area see
Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442 (1979).
84. Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959).
85. See Dilloff, supra note 81, at 11. See also Rodriguez v. State, 327 So. 2d 903, 904
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sons86  while hypnotized. Courts also rule inadmissible
inculpatory statements and confessions gained through hypno-
sis.8 7 Generally, the cases demonstrate great reluctance to coun-
tenance the admission of evidence elicited while the party sub-
ject is hypnotized."'
On the other hand, courts have been much more willing to
admit testimony from previously hypnotized witnesses who are
not hypnotized at the moment of testimony.89 Since 1968, four-
teen jurisdictions have admitted testimony from witnesses who
had undergone hypnosis prior to trial, 0 generally recognizing
that evidence of prior hypnosis can be used for impeachment
purposes.9 1 Harding v. State92 established this trend.
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 728-29, 273 N.W.2d
539, 543-44 (1978); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1326-27 (Okla. 1975).
86. E.g., People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 664-66, 602 P.2d 738, 753-54, 159 Cal. Rptr.
818, 833-34 (1979).
87. People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951).
88. In many of the reported cases in point, the accused was endeavoring to
present to the jury hypnotic evidence of innocence; however, in others it was
the prosecution which Bought to place on the witness stand an individual
whose testimony would be incriminating, but whose memory of the crimes had
partially lapsed because of the passage of time, the consumption of drugs, or
the trauma of being the victim of the unlawful events leading to the trial itself.
While in the former instances the accused generally argued to little or no avail
for the admissibility of the evidence, in the latter the defendant was unsuccess-
ful in attempting to block introduction of the testimony.
Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442, 446-47 (1979).
89. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. 1980).
90. Ninth Circuit, United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978); Eastern
District of Michigan, United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Flor-
ida, Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Georgia, Creamer v. State,
232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); Indiana, Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468 (Ind.
1982); Illinois, People v. Smrekar, 68 II. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); Maryland,
Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969);
Missouri, State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 450
U.S. 1027 (1981); New Jersey, State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); New York,
People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Onondaga County Ct. 1979), rev'd,
88 A.D.2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1982); North Carolina, State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96,
244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); Oregon, State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971);
Washington, State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982); Wyoming, Chap-
man v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). At least one of these jurisdictions, Maryland,
has since retreated from its position. See Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d
1272 (1982).
91. In United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969), the court held that the
government had a duty to disclose to the defense that an identification witness had been
hypnotized and examined by an expert and by the assistant United States attorney in
charge of the case. The court thought that there was a significant possibility that knowl-
edge of the hypnosis would induce reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds concerning
credibility of this key witness. Defense expert witnesses, upon motion for new trial, gave
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In Harding, the defendant was convicted of intent to rape,
and of assault with intent to murder. The only evidence offered
against him was the testimony of the victim, underpants with
sperm stains, and evidence that the defendant had been seen in
the vicinity of the crime the night of the incident.93 In her first
nonhypnotic interview with police, the victim identified another
person as her rapist and claimed she had been "abducted at
knife point, taken into the country, raped and stabbed."9 After
two more interviews with police, she realized she had been shot,
not stabbed, and "her mind had cleared to the point where she
knew who had shot her." She also knew "who was with her" and
she knew "the complete description of the automobile" but
could not remember certain other events. 5 She then was taken
to police headquarters and placed under hypnosis. While under
hypnosis and "without prompting" she was able to recall some
of these events and identified the defendant as her assailantY6
At trial she testified as to the memories. On appeal, regarding
the victim's competency to testify, the court stated:
[Tjhe witness testified that at the time she was on the stand
she remembered the incident she was describing, but in addi-
tion to that we have the testimony of the operator who gave a
detailed description of what happened at the time hypnosis
was induced which showed that there were no improper sugges-
tions made. Further he gave his opinion as a trained and
experienced psychologist that in this particular incident there
was no reason to doubt the accuracy of the witness' recollec-
tions. In addition modern medical science has now recognized
the possibility that memory of painful events can sometimes be
restored by hypnosis, although some authorities warn that
fancy can be mingled with fact in some cases .9
their opinions under oath that repetition of the story by the identification witness under
hypnosis could have imprinted the story on his mind in such a way as to make the wit-
ness impervious to cross-examination. There was suggestion in the case that this identi-
fication witness was in a trance when he testified. But the Second Circuit declined to
express any suggestion that the hypnosis rendered the witness totally incompetent to
testify.
92. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). This was
the first case to admit the testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses. See supra note
79.
93. Harding, 5 Md. App. at 234, 246 A.2d at 306.
94. Id. at 232, 246 A.2d at 304.
95. Id. at 232-34, 246 A.2d at 304-06.
96. Id. at 233, 246 A.2d at 305.
97. Id. at 239-40, 246 A.2d at 311-12 (citations omitted).
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Based on these conclusions, the court ruled that receipt in evi-
dence of the testimony of this witness who had been subjected
to pretrial hypnosis was not reversible error.
The Harding court made the basic assumption that such
evidence was both reliable and accurate.9 8 This assumption,
however, rested on several crucial misconceptions. The evidence
was probably neither reliable nor accurate.9 The court based its
finding of scientific reliability on the testimony of a single
expert-hardly a basis from which to judge scientific reliability.
One commentator states that the Harding expert's claim that
hypnosis does not give rise to suggestion directly contradicts all
scientific evidence.100 In addition, the hypnosis process was by
no means truly impartial. The expert was employed by the
police '01 and the victim knew she was being hypnotized in order
to recall the identity of her assailant.102 The hypnotism took
place in police headquarters with investigators present."' Imme-
diately following the session, the investigators questioned the
witness and asked what had happened between Harding and
her. 0 "It seems apparent that there was a strong desire on the
part of everyone involved .. .to confirm their arrest and have
the witness identify the subject."' 10 5 Furthermore, the victim
changed her story after hypnosis. The hypnosis process not only
elicited new details but changed others.'0 This strongly suggests
confabulation or memory distortion.107 Lastly, the court found it
significant that the victim believed she was testifying from her
own recollection of the facts. Scientific studies of hypnosis
almost uniformly support the conclusion that hypnotized sub-
jects are unable accurately to sort actual recollections from sug-
98. See id. at 235-36, 246 A.2d at 306; Dilloff, supra note 81, at 19.
99. See Dilloff, supra note 81, at 19. See also People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App.
145, 156-57, 310 N.W.2d 306, 311 (1981).
100. Diamond, supra note 16, at 322-23. See also People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich.
App. at 156-57, 310 N.W.2d at 311-12.
101. Dilloff, supra note 81, at 19.
102. Id. See also supra notes 22-23.
103. Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. at 241-42, 246 A.2d at 308-10. Dr. Martin Orne
states that neutrality of the site of the hypnosis session and absence of police investiga-
tors is a minimum requisite to ensure the absence of suggestion. Affidavit of Martin T.
Orne, M.D., Ph.D., at 26, Quaglino v. California, 439 U.S. 875 (1978)(leave to file affida-
vit in petition for cert. granted, but cert. denied) [hereinafter cited as Orne Affidavit].
104. Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. at 233, 246 A.2d at 305.
105. Dilloff, supra note 81, at 19.
106. Id. at 19-20.
107. Id. at 19. See also People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306
(1981).
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gested and implanted "facts." ' 8
Despite these shortcomings, in the next ten years, court
after court followed Harding.1°9 Some simply cited Harding and
its progeny as authority for the proposition that hypnosis is
merely another form of refreshing recollection and presents an
issue of credibility, not admissibility. 10 Others, especially in
recent years, have gone beyond Harding's cursory analysis of
hypnosis,' taking notice of the potential unreliability of the
hypno-induced testimony but nevertheless allowing its eviden-
tiary use.1 2 Still others have combined both approaches and
added a constitutional due process analysis" 3 before condoning
the evidentiary use of hypnosis." 4 In the last two years, how-
ever, several courts have faced the problems associated with
hypnosis and a number of courts have broken with Harding."5
The leading case in this trend is State v. Mack."'
State v. Mack concerned the admissibility of testimony of a
108. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text, discussing the unreliability of
hypnosis in eliciting accurate facts. See also Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 7-11;
Diamond, supra note 16, at 335-36; Dilloff, supra note 81, at 10.
109. Only one court during this period, Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710,
716, 204 S.E.2d 414, 418 (1974), found hypno-induced evidence inadmissible. This case,
however, can be distinguished because the defendant claimed that his own exculpatory
statements made under hypnosis should be admissible. Defendant's exculpatory state-
ments made under hypnosis are never admissible. The court never reached the issue of
admissibility of direct testimony from a previously hypnotized witness so presumably the
question remains open in Virginia.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Awkward, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067
(9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); Clark v.
State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. App. 1979); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240
(1974); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1974); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or.
App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971).
111. See Dilloff, supra note 81, at 17-20. See also supra notes 92-108 and accompa-
nying text.
112. See, e.g., People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1982); Chap-
man v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
113. See infra notes 220-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the due pro-
cess analysis, similar to that undertaken when considering the suggestibility of "line-
ups."
114. See, e.g., United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); State v.
Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d
643 (1979); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1970).
115. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); People v. Bicknell, 114 Cal.
App. 3d 388 (1980)(available on LEXIS, States library, Cal. file), hearing granted, Crim.
21852, Cal. (Feb. 11, 1981); Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981); People
v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764
(Minn. 1980); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
116. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
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victim who, before hypnosis, could not remember what had hap-
pened to her. After hypnosis the police developed a "typewritten
statement recounting as her present memory the events of May
13, as she had reported them under hypnosis.' 17 The court
noted at the outset of its opinion that it was "presented . . .
with a unique opportunity to examine in full the merits of [the]
controversy" 1 8 surrounding the admissibility of testimony based
on hypnotic refreshment. Five experts in the field of hypnosis
provided testimony; the California Attorneys for Criminal Jus-
tice and the Minnesota State Public Defender filed briefs amici
curiae."9
After examining all of the material, the court concluded
that while hypnosis may remove blocks to accurate recall, it is
generally used in the medical profession as a therapeutic tool.
The court also noted that therapeutic goals of hypnosis can be
achieved without historically accurate recall and that the sub-
jects' impressions are more important to psychiatrists and psy-
chologists than discovery of truth.12 0 Hypnosis, therefore, may
not be so useful where the truthfulness of the restored memory
is important, as at trial.
Additionally, the court found that the hypnotized subject is
highly susceptible to suggestion, even though subtle or unin-
tended. 2 1 The hypnotized subject will fill in gaps in memory,
fantasizing in order to please either the hypnotist or those who
asked the person to undergo hypnotism. Unfortunately, there is
no way to determine which part of the "restored" memory is
truthful, fanciful, or fallacious.
The restored memory also becomes hardened in the sub-
ject's mind after hypnosis. This conviction is so firm that per-
sons have been able to pass lie detector tests after hypnosis
while testifying to utter falsehoods. No meaningful cross-exami-
nation of such a witness could shake that witness's belief in the
accuracy of the testimony. Two of the experts told the court that
the posthypnotic suggestion, "you will remember very clearly
everything that happened on the 13th and 14th," would assure
that the witness would remember what she related under hypno-
117. Id. at 767.
118. Id. at 765.
119. Id. at 765-66.
120. Id. at 768.
121. Id.
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sis as a memory of the actual events themselves.122
Based on this expert testimony the court found that in
order for hypno-induced testimony to be admissible, hypnosis
must meet the standards of scientific reliability, commonly
called the Frye standard.2 3 Under the Frye rule, "the results of
mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the
testing has developed or improved to the point where experts in
the field widely share the view that the results are scientifically
reliable as accurate."124 The court concluded that hypnosis did
not pass this test and "regardless of whether such evidence is
offered by the defense or by the prosecution a witness whose
memory has been revived under hypnosis must not be permitted
to testify in a criminal proceeding to matters he or she remem-
bers under hypnosis. "125
The supreme courts of Arizona 126 and Pennsylvania 2 7 reach
the identical conclusion: hypnosis does not pass the Frye stan-
122. Id. at 769.
123. Id. at 768-69. The standard was announced in United States v. Frye, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the court held lie detector results inadmissible because
experts did not agree on their reliability. Accord, People v. Bicknell, 114 Cal. App. 3d
388 (1980) (available on LEXIS, States library, Cal. file); Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382,
427 A.2d 1041 (1981); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 97, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
124. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768. The Frye court held lie detector results
inadmissible stating:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the exper-
imental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twi-
light zone the evidentiary force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.
United States v. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
125. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 771.
126. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
The determination of guilt or innocence of an accused should not depend on
the unknown consequences of a procedure concededly used for the purpose of
changing in some way a witness's memory. Therefore, until hypnosis gains
general acceptance in the fields of medicine and psychiatry as a method by
which memories are accurately improved without undue danger of distortion,
delusion or fantasy, we feel that testimony of witnesses which has been tainted
by hypnosis should be excluded in criminal cases.
Id. at 231, 624 P.2d at 1279. The supreme court of Arizona has limited this position. See
State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).
127. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981). "Similarly, we
do not believe that the process of refreshing recollection by hypnosis has gained suffi-
cient acceptance in its field as a means of accurately restoring forgotten or repressed
memory." Id. at 110, 436 A.2d at 177.
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dard and hypno-induced testimony is not admissible in a court
of law. Similarly, appellate courts of California"' and Michi-
gan2 9 have followed Mack, and two other states, Massachu-
setts ° and Maryland, 31 while not ruling explicitly on the
admissibility of hypno-induced testimony, remanded the issue
with explicit instructions to the trial court to make findings con-
cerning the scientific reliability of hypnosis. The most recent
jurisdiction to follow Mack is the California Supreme Court in
People v. Shirley.13 2 There, the defendant, convicted of forcible
rape, had challenged the admission of testimony from the sole
complainant who had been hypnotized prior to trial. The facts
in Shirley are worth noting because they provide a prototypical
example of the misuse of hypnosis."'3
In Shirley, a previous boyfriend of the victim, 34 Marine
128. People v. Bicknell, 114 Cal. App. 3d 388 (1980) (available on LEXIS, States
library, Cal. file), hearing granted, Crim. 21582, Cal. (Feb. 11, 1981).
129. State v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981).
130. Commonwealth v. Juvenile, 412 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1980). See also Common-
wealth v. Stetson, 427 N.E.2d 926, 931 n.10 (Mass. 1981).
131. Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981). This case is extremely
significant because it effectively overrules Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d
302 (1968), cert. denied, 242 Md. 731, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). Explaining its
decision, the Polk court stated:
In Harding, we did not assess the Frye principle, the rule there enunciated not
having been applied in this State until Reed [Reed v. State, 203 Md. 374, 391
A.2d 364 (1978)]; nor did we have occasion to probe the question-here
directly raised on the authority of Reed-of the general acceptability of hypno-
tism as a reliable technique for memory retrieval within the relevant scientific
community.
Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. at 392, 427 A.2d at 1047. The court remanded with explicit
instructions to the trial court to make a "determination of the general acceptability vel
non of hypnosis." Id. at 394, 427 A.2d at 1048. In Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447
A.2d 1272 (1982), the court in fact overruled Harding.
132. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133
(1982).
133. Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, described the record as a classic case of
conflicting stories.
There were only two principal witnesses to the event: The complaining witness,
Catherine C., told the jury the defendant compelled her by threat and force to
submit to sexual intercourse and to orally copulate him; defendant testified,
however, that Catherine willingly participated in the act of intercourse and
there was no oral copulation.
Justice Mosk justly concluded that "[i]n circumstances it is particularly important that
the testimony of the complaining witness be free of taint, lest a mistaken conviction
result. Yet as we shall see,. . . the prosecution contaminated Catherine's testimony by
subjecting her to a hypnotic experience on the eve of trial." People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d
at 23, 641 P.2d at 776-77, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45.
134. They had lived together for about one month. Id. at 28 n.12, 641 P.2d at 779
n.12, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 247 n.12.
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Sergeant Lockskin, testified he met the victim on the night in
question at Bud's Cove where she worked as a cocktail waitress.
He stated she was drinking alone, looked like she was under the
influence of alcohol, and staggered when she walked. He offered
her a ride home, which she accepted, but upon their arrival at
her apartment she vomited in the street and had to be helped
into the house. While the victim was ill the individual, later
identified as the defendant, came up to Lockskin, addressed him
by name but left when asked to by Lockskin. 135 Lockskin testi-
fied that once in the house the victim immediately passed out on
the couch and he then left.136
The victim's version of later events led to the defendant's
arrest and the defendant's rape conviction. This version, how-
ever, changed considerably between her initial statement to
police, and at the preliminary hearing, and her version after
hypnosis which was ultimately presented to the jury. Her initial
story to police was that she awoke in her bedroom and found
herself bound and gagged. It was dark and she could not identify
her assailant. She was forced to engage in sexual intercourse
both before and after being forced to orally copulate. (The fact
that she claimed he never took off the gag during the oral sex
was pointed out in the briefs filed with the court.)1 37 She also
stated that during both sex acts her hands were tied behind her
back. She asserted he abruptly stopped sexual intercourse,
removed her binds and gag, and turned on the lights whereupon
she discovered the defendant. They both went into the front
room where she also discovered defendant had a knife and ice
pick. 3 For the next half hour the two sat naked on the victim's
couch, she sitting on his lap while they chatted. The defendant
told her his name, where he lived, the military unit to which he
was assigned, and that he was married but his wife was away.
She claimed the defendant offered to get some beer, got dressed,
and went to his apartment, later returning with the beer. During
his absence the victim did not contact police, leave the apart-
135. The defendant explained that he was there only at the prior invitation of the
victim. Id. at 27-28, 641 P.2d at 779, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
136. Id. at 24, 641 P.2d at 777, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
137. Supplemental Brief for Defendant at 4, People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641
P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
138. She later described the ice pick as really being a large Phillips screwdriver. At
trial, the prosecution produced neither knife, ice pick, screwdriver, nor any other
weapon. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 24 n.2, 641 P.2d at 777 n.2, 181 Cal Rptr. at 243
n.2.
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ment to seek help, or even lock the front door.
Upon the defendant's return he again undressed. Both
naked-the victim did not dress in his absence-the victim sat
on his lap and they continued their conversation. At defendant's
suggestion they agreed to take a shower but a telephone call
from a friend informing the victim she was coming over
prompted the defendant to leave. The victim invited the defen-
dant to come over another time and offered to cook him dinner
at that time. He left when the victim's friend, Mickie, arrived.
The victim then informed Mickie that the defendant had raped
her and Mickie gave her a 100 milligram dose of Mellaril from
the victim's prescription for that drug.1 39 A half hour later Mick-
ie left, and the victim called the police.140
The police officer who responded to her complaint testified
he found her under the influence of alcohol; her breath had the
smell of someone who had been drinking quite heavily; her
speech was slow and at times difficult to understand."" The
physician who examined her at the hospital testified that he
found a bruise mark on her right hip and crease marks on her
wrists. He described them as the kind of marks one received
from sleeping on wrinkles on the bed. "' He also testified that
Mellaril is a powerful tranquilizer and that in doses of 100 milli-
grams or more per day it is prescribed primarily for psychoses,
schizophrenia, and manic depression episodes.4 3
In response to the victim's complaint, police arrested the
defendant the next morning at his apartment. Informed that the
charges were burglary and rape, defendant vigorously disputed
the victim's version.14 4 He took the stand at trial in his own
defense and stated he had met the victim previously at Bud's
Cove. On the night in question he again went to Bud's Cove and,
although the victim was with Sergeant Lockskin, she invited him
139. Mellaril had been prescribed for her to take four times a day and she had taken
such dosage for six months. She denied using the drug in the last 18 months. Id. at 25
n.6, 641 P.2d at 778 n.6, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 246 n.6. At the hospital on the night of the
rape, however, she told the treating physician that she used "occasional Mellaril and
alcohol frequently." Id. at 27, 641 P.2d at 779, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
140. The victim stated at trial she did not know Mickie's last name, address, or
telephone number or where she was at the time of trial and included she had never seen
her since the night in question. Not surprisingly, Mickie never testified at trial. Id. at
26, 641 P.2d at 778, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
141. Id. at 26, 641 P.2d at 779, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
142. Id. at 27, 641 P.2d at 779, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 27, 29, 641 P.2d at 779, 780, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 247, 248.
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to drop by the apartment anytime. He left Bud's, was unsuccess-
ful in locating a friend, and decided to take the victim up on her
offer. He arrived at her apartment the second time, 45 and after
repeated knocking, she eventually opened the door, wherepon
the defendant asked her if she was okay. She let him in, laid
down on the couch and he sat next to her. At her invitation they
proceeded to kiss and subsequently moved into the bedroom and
engaged in sexual intercourse. He substantially corroborated the
victim's story about what occurred after engaging in sex. He
denied breaking into her apartment, threatening her with a
knife, tying her up, having intercourse without her consent, or
engaging in any act of oral copulation."'
Prior to trial (approximately three months after the alleged
rape) the prosecuting attorney had the victim hypnotized by
another deputy district attorney. According to the victim
"before being hypnotized she remembered the events of the eve-
ning in question only 'vaguely.' 11117 She agreed to be hypnotized
"for the purpose of going back over what had occurred."
Although never previously hypnotized "she just knew that it
enables a person to remember more than normal."'"48 After hyp-
nosis, her memory of the events had changed considerably and
became the basis of her trial testimony.
The victim testified at trial that she awoke on the couch to
find the defendant standing naked by the coffee table with a
knife and screwdriver in his hand. He then forced her into the
bedroom where he tied her up; whereas in her previous version
she had awakened in the bedroom, already bound, and with the
lights off. She first was forced to orally copulate the defendant
but, unlike her prior testimony, her hands now were not tied.
Sexual intercourse now took place only after oral copulation, not
before. Significantly her altered memory only related to the con-
sensual elements of the crime; the testimony concerning the
events after sex remained virtually unchanged. Confronted at
trial with these inconsistencies, she credited hypnosis with caus-
145. The first time, he had left after talking to Sergeant Lockskin. See supra note
135.
146. The defendant's company commander, platoon commander, and company first
sergeant all testified at trial that the defendant had a good reputation for truth and
honesty and that defendant had no history of engaging in violent or aggressive behavior.
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 29, 641 P.2d at 780, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
147. Id. at 30, 641 P.2d at 781, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
148. Id.
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ing her to fill in gaps in her memory and to help her recall that
certain events took place in a different sequence." 9
Unrefuted expert testimony presented at trial stated that
there is no guarantee that memory recalled under hypnosis is
correct. A witness can be mistaken, confabulate, or wilfully lie
while hypnotized. In addition, no one is able to determine if a
subject is lying while hypnotized; a subconscious motive to dis-
tort the truth may distort the memory. More important, and
particularly relevant in this case, discrepancies under hypnosis
imply either that the previous memory was a lie, or the memory
under hypnosis was confabulated. Faced with the contradictory
testimony of the victim and the inherent unreliability of hypno-
sis the court held: "In accord with recent and persuasive case
law and the overwhelming consensus of expert opinion, we con-
clude that the testimony of [a previously hypnotized] witness
should not be admitted in the courts of California. '
Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, began his analysis
with a thorough review of the relevant case law. He determined,
based on this review, that the proper approach to the issue of
hypnosis is that "testimony of witnesses who have undergone
hypnosis for the purposes of restoring their memory of the
events in issue cannot be received in evidence unless it satisfies
the Frye standard of admissibility."' 5 1 Justice Mosk rejected the
Attorney General's claim that the record was inadequate to sup-
port a decision of general inadmissibility of hypnotically aided
testimony. Although only one expert testified at the trial,' "he
gave an unequivocal opinion that hypnosis was unreliable as a
truth seeking device""' and that "that testimony was supported
by a substantial body of scholarly treatises and articles on the
subject.' 15 4 The court, relying principally on the works of Eliza-
beth F. Loftus,15 5 Dr. Bernard Diamond,1 56 and Dr. Martin
149. This is an excellent example of a witness being subjectively convinced of the
accuracy of two probably false stories while under hypnosis. Other excellent examples
are found in Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 19-23; Dilloff, supra note 81; Orne, supra
note 28, at 329-331.
150. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 23, 641 P.2d at 776, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
151. Id. at 54, 641 P.2d at 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265. Accord State v. Mena, 128
Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); Common-
wealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
152. The expert was Dr. Donald W. Shafer. For Dr. Shafer's credentials, see People
v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 31 n.13, 641 P.2d at 781 n.13, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 249 n.13.
153. Id. at 55, 641 P.2d at 797, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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Orne 15 7 concluded:
The professional literature fully supports the testimony of Dr.
Schafer and the similar findings of the courts in Mack, Mena,
and Nazarovitch. It also demonstrates beyond any doubt that
at the present time the use of hypnosis to restore the memory
of a potential witness is not generally accepted as reliable by
the relevant scientific community. Indeed, representative
groups within that community are on record as expressly
opposing this technique for many of the foregoing reasons, par-
ticularly when it is employed by law enforcement hypnotists.
In these circumstances it is obvious that the Frye test of
admissibility has not been satisfied. We therefore hold ...
that the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis
for the purpose of restoring his memory of the events in issue
is inadmissible as to all matters relating to those events, from
the time of the hypnotic session forward."'
As limitations on the ruling of per se inadmissibility, the
court added that a witness still could testify to topics wholly
unrelated to the events covered by hypnosis. Police still may use
hypnosis as a purely investigative tool 5 9 and admission of testi-
mony from a previously hypnotized witness is not reversible
error per se but must be judged under the prejudical error
test.6 0 Applying the latter test to the facts before it, the court
found the admission of the victim's testimony to be prejudical
error. "[The testimony] constituted virtually the sole incriminat-
ing evidence against [the] defendant. To prevent a miscarriage
of justice, a conviction predicated on such tainted evidence can-
not be allowed to stand."''1
156. For credentials of Dr. Diamond, see People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 63 n.45, 641
P.2d at 802 n.45, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 270 n.45.
157. For credentials of Dr. Orne, see id.
158. Id. at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
159. The court added: "We reiterate, however, that for the reasons stated above any
person who has been hypnotized for investigative purposes will not be allowed to testify
as a witness to the events that were the subject of the hypnotic session." Id. at 68, 641
P.2d at 805, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273-74.
160. See People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 846 (1957).
161. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 70, 641 P.2d at 806, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 275. The
California court has, however, refused to adopt a per se exclusion of post-hypnosis testi-
mony. Instead, the court has elected to examine the dual purposes behind Shirley (pro-
tecting against colored and unreliable testimony, and assuring the effective right to
cross-examination) to determine the need for the testimony's exclusion. See People v.
Adams, 137 Cal. App. 3d 346, 187 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1982).
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III. ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The Frye standard has been adopted by a majority of courts
throughout the United States."'2 It has been used to determine
the admissibility of evidence derived from polygraphs,-""
voiceprints,164 neutron activation analyses, 165 gunshot residue
tests, bitemark comparisons, 6" sodium pentothal,1" electron
microscopic scanning analyses,169 and numerous other forensic
techniques.1 70 The principal justification for the Frye standard is
that it establishes a method for insuring the reliability of scien-
tific evidence. 17 The primary advantage of the Frye test, how-
ever, is in its essentially conservative nature.171
Most courts that have found that hypnosis does not involve
scientific evidence have done so because hypno-induced testi-
mony does not fit neatly within the traditional view of scientific
evidence: results from scientific tests or experiments relayed by
162. See supra note 123; supra text accompanying note 150. See also State v. Wash-
ington, 229 Kan. 47, 53, 622 P.2d 986, 991 (1981).
163. State v. McCarty, 224 Kan. 179, 182, 578 P.2d 274, 277 (1978); State v. Pleas-
ant, 21 Wash. App. 177, 185, 583 P.2d 680, 685 (1978).
164. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
165. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
994 (1971); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1972).
166. State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App. 183, 193, 362 N.E.2d 1239, 1246 (1976).
167. People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1978); State v. Jones
273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979). For an interesting discussion of Jones, see Evidence,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 32 S.C.L. REv. 119 (1980).
168. State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430, 462 P.2d 729 (1969); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla.
Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951).
169. People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 252, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 471 (1975).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1971)(ink identifi-
cation test); People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251, 253
(1958)(Nalline test); Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959)(paraffin tests);
People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949)(breathalyzer test); People v.
Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1973)(trace metal detection test); Puhl v.
Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959)(medical testimony
respecting cause of birth defects)(overruled on other grounds in In re Stromsted, 229
N.W.2d 226 (Wis. 1980)); State v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975)(human leucocyte
antigen test).
171. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. U.S.: A
Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1197, 1207 (1980).
172. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245-46, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
149 (1976):
For a variety of reasons, Frye was deliberately intended to interpose a substan-
tial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scien-
tific principles. There has always existed a considerable lag between advances
and discoveries in scientific fields and their acceptance as evidence in a court
proceeding .... Several reasons founded in logic and common sense support a
posture of judicial caution in this area.
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expert testimony. These courts claim that hypno-induced testi-
mony does not consist of the results of a mechanical device or
test such as a polygraph or tissue analysis. Rather, it is testi-
mony offered by an eyewitness whose recollection has been
refreshed as to the incident from which the trial arises. 173
"Although the device by which recollection was refreshed is
unusual, in legal effect [the witness's] situation is not different
from that of a witness who claims his recollection of an event
that he could not earlier remember was revived when he thereaf-
ter read a particular document."1 7 ' Thus, as is typical of any
method of refreshing recollection, once the witness testifies that
he remembers the incident he is to describe, the mechanism of
refreshment becomes irrelevant. 7 5
Such reasoning ignores the problem associated with hypno-
sis: the testimony by the witness that he remembers the event
he is describing is the direct result of the scientific process of
hypnosis. In order critically to assess the reliability of such testi-
mony, one must examine the scientific process of hypnosis to see
if it can lead to accurate recall.176 The court in Polk v. State17
observed: "The technique of hypnosis is scientific, but the testi-
mony itself of the witness is the end product of the administra-
tion of the technique. The induced recall of the witness is
dependent upon, and cannot be disassociated from, the underly-
ing scientific method.' '1 7  Similarly, the California Supreme
Court states: "[I]f the testimony is thus only as reliable as the
hypnotic process itself, it must be judged by the same standards
of admissibility.' 1 79 Accordingly, courts should approach hypno-
sis as a scientific process, and employ the Frye standard to
determine whether hypnosis is generally accepted in the scien-
tific community as a proper mode of refreshing recollection.
The use of the Frye standard has not been universally
173. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980).
174. Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 1982)(quoting Kline v. Ford
Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975)).
175. "[T]he witness testified that at the time she was on the stand she remembered
the incident she was describing." Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 239, 246 A.2d 302,
311 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). Accord People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d
379, 384, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1979).
176. See People v. Gonzales, 118 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306, leave to appeal
granted, 412 Mich. 870 (1981); supra notes 22-71 and accompanying text.
177. 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981).
178. Id. at 393-94, 427 A.2d at 1048.
179. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 641 P.2d 775, 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 264,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
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accepted and has received extensive criticism by many legal
commentators. 180 They claim Frye sets too high a standard for
admissibility and prevents acceptance of relevant evidence.' 8 '
Problems arise in identifying the proper scientific field for evalu-
ating general acceptance, 8 s defining exactly what must be
accepted,' and defining what constitutes "general" acceptance
in that field. 8 4 Because of these criticisms, as well as others's
180. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §
210 at 489-90 (2d ed. 1972); Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Crimi-
nal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313 (1964); Giannelli, supra note 171, at 1197; Note, Changing
the Standard for the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 757 (1979); Comment, Admissibility of Testimony, supra note 27.
181. State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 978-79 (La. 1979):
[I]t has been suggested that the requirement of "general acceptance" is tanta-
mount to a requirement that the validity of the test be susceptible of such
demonstration as to enable the trial court to take judicial notice of the fact.
Clearly, the criteria used for determining the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence should not require the instant and unquestionable demonstration
required for the judicial notice of scientific facts.
The Frye standard, however, is not set up to ensure absolute perfection in any scientific
technique. Its value lies in the protective barrier of acceptance, by people whose job it is
to study and understand a scientific technique, before lay jurors and court personnel are
exposed to a technique they are neither prepared nor qualified to judge. See People v.
Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 405, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (1977)("It therefore is best to adhere
to a standard which in effect permits the experts who know most about a procedure to
experiment and to study it. In effect, they form a kind of technical jury, which must first
pass on the scientific status of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in making its
findings of fact.").
182. Often, more than one field of science may be involved in the use of a particular
technique. Consequently, deciding the proper field to which the technique belongs may
present enormous difficulties. Giannelli, supra note 171, at 1208-10.
183. This problem concerns whether the Frye test requires "general acceptance of
the scientific technique or of both the underlying principle and the technique applying
it." Id. at 1211.
184. The problem centers around how courts reach the conclusion that the principle
or technique is generally accepted. To what extent should courts rely only on expert
testimony or take judicial notice of scientific literature on the subject? See id. at 1213-
19. See also People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 55-56, 641 P.2d at 796-98, 181 Cal. Rptr. at
265-66.
185. One commentator offers two additional criticisms of the Frye standard.
Applied specifically to hypnotism, Frye does not permit analysis of the reliability of the
hypnotic process used in each case to test reliability, but instead focuses on the general
reliability of hypnotism. Also, if hypnotism is reliable under Frye, using Frye as the sole
criterion for admissibility may result in admission of evidence to which the jury will
attach undue weight. See Comment, Admissibility of Testimony, supra note 27, at 1218.
These criticisms are not particularly persuasive. The point is that Frye ensures that the
trier of fact will never have to judge the reliability of a process, in a case-by-case method,
until the scientific community can agree on the general reliability in any specific case.
Second, like any other evidentiary problem, relevancy and reliability are the initial ques-
tions. If the probative value is outweighed by other considerations, the evidence still may
be excluded. The Frye standard only applies to the initial question: Is this relevant,
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many courts reject the Frye standard and adopt the less strin-
gent relevancy standard 18 6  usually associated with Professor
McCormick. 1 7
The relevancy approach, however, does not adequately pro-
tect against the admission of unreliable scientific evidence. The
assumption underlying the relevancy approach is that the adver-
sarial process is a sufficient safeguard against unreliable scien-
tific evidence,188 and the jury is capable of independently evalu-
ating the offered testimony. 89 Unfortunately, most courts have
utilized the relevancy approach when deciding on the admissibil-
ity of the forensic use of hypnosis.190 These courts have been all
reliable evidence that is admissible in a court of law? A positive answer does not auto-
matically end all analysis as some commentators seem to think. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
186. See Cappolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d
120 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970); State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975 (La.
1979); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d
626 (D.C. 1979).
187. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 363-64 (1st ed. 1954). The
McCormick approach and the Federal Rules of Evidence are virtually identical. Compare
C. MCCORMICK supra, at 363-64 with FED. R. EvID. 401, 702. For the sake of brevity, this
article refers to both the McCormick and federal rule approaches as the "relevancy"
approach.
188. United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975). ("Unless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular tech-
nique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant
scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to
be attacked by cross-examination and refutation.").
189. [I]t is important to understand how different juries are today than they
were when the restrictive rules of evidence were first developed. On the whole
... they know generally what is going on in the world. Their educational
background is extensive. They think. They reason. They are really very good
at sorting out good evidence from bad, of separating the credible witness from
the incredible, and of disregarding experts who attempt to inject their opinions
into areas of which they have little knowledge.... A modern jury, that must
deliberate, and must agree, is the ideal body to evaluate opinions of this kind.
United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 98 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Awkward, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978); Kline v. Ford
Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Co., 503 F.2d 506
(9th Cir. 1974); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1980); People v. Smrekar, 68 111. App.
3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 306 (1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 N.E.2d 414 (1978);
State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1, 192 P.2d 312 (1971); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280
(Wyo. 1982). These courts refuse to treat hypno-induced testimony as scientific evidence.
By treating the issue as essentially one of witness credibility, they relegate the questions
of hypnosis to a matter for the trier of fact. Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468, 473 (Ind.
1982). This approach is exactly the relevancy standard as espoused by McCormick. See
supra note 187.
Numerous courts very recently have held that the witness is only rendered incompe-
tent to testify to new or changed facts elicited under hypnosis. State ex rel Collins v.
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too willing to rely on the adversarial process to assist the trier of
fact in judging the credibility of the witness.19' One commenta-
tor suggests extensive cross-examination of the previously hyp-
notized witness coupled with expert testimony and extensive
cross-examination of those experts will allow the trier of fact to
adequately appraise both the reliability of the hypnosis process
and the accuracy (and conversely, the credibility) of the result-
ing testimony. 19' Some courts share this view. "[Defendant] was
entitled to, and did, challenge the reliability of both the
remembered facts and the hypnosis procedure itself by extensive
and thorough cross-examination of [the witness] and the hypno-
tist. Under the circumstances, we perceive no abuse of discretion
by the district court.')99
The relevancy approach, however, is simply inappropriate
because hypno-induced evidence and typical scientific evidence
are not the same. Typically, scientific evidence consists of results
of scientific tests performed by experts and relayed to the jury
Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); Strong v. State, 435 N.E.2d 969
(Ind. 1982); Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982); People v. Nixon, 114
Mich. App. 233, 318 N.W.2d 655 (1982); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 249 Pa. Super. 171,
439 A.2d 805 (1982). The witness remains competent to testify to facts or matters that
the witness was able to recall or relate prior to hypnosis. People v. Jackson, 114 Mich.
App. 649, 319 N.W.2d 613 (1982). While appearing at first blush to enjoy the merit of
compromise between extreme positions, these decisions are unsound in principle because
the subsequent testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized (concerning the event in
question) at any time prior to testimony has been contaminated. Among other reasons,
unintended and unobserved suggestions under hypnosis may render the witness impervi-
ous to cross-examination. Thus, cross-examiners could not probe the accuracy of state-
ments made prior to hypnosis if the hypnotic session could have affected the witness's
perceptions or beliefs. See Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 6. See also infra notes 195,
214.
191. See, e.g., People v. Smrekar, 68 11. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979).
192. Spector & Foster, supra note 73, at 590-95. "[The operator's] opinion of the
reliability of the technique as a device for retrieving forgotten information would be elic-
ited, and be subject to probing cross-examination. The operator would also offer his
opinion of whether the witness's recollection was actually restored during hypnosis." Id.
at 593. Many authorities in the field strongly disagree with this last statement. As Dr.
Orne states, it is virtually impossible to tell without independent corroboration how
accurate recollection may be. See Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 14. Dr. Diamond
states that "such a solution is naive!" Diamond, supra note 16, at 330.
193. Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 1982). Accord United States v.
Awkward, 596 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); United States v.
Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. App.
1979); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302
(1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 417
N.Y.S.2d 643 (1979); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v.
Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971).
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as ultimate facts by those same experts. The jury is free to
believe or disbelieve the expert as to that ultimate fact. Thus,
scientific evidence regarding hypnosis consists of expert testi-
mony about both the hypnosis procedure and its possible
results. 194 The evidence, however, goes one step further. It also
consists of the nonexpert testimony of the direct eyewitness.
This testimony is both the ultimate result (i.e., the product of
the hypnosis), and more importantly, the ultimate fact (i.e., the
facts on which the jury must decide the case). In the typical
case, the jury will be confronted with diametrically opposed
expert testimony and one subjectively convinced eyewitness 95
who swears: "This is what I saw." 1' While a jury may be free to
believe or disbelieve either expert about the possible results of
the hypnosis, most juries would be hard pressed to disbelieve the
previously hypnotized witness 9 who is convinced of the truth of
his hypno-induced memory.1 98
Furthermore, the subjective conviction in the truth of the
memory after hypnosis eliminates fear of perjury as a factor
ensuring reliable testimony. 99 The problem of fabrication which
194. Even experienced hypnotists are unable to tell if persons remember accurately
under hypnosis or are only remembering pseudomemories. Orne Affidavit, supra note
103, at 14; Diamond, supra note 16, at 337; Dilloff, supra note 81, at 6; Spector & Foster,
supra note 73, at 578. Therefore any expert testimony as to the accuracy of the resulting
memories of the witness after hypnosis can only be speculative at best.
195. "Hypnotized witnesses become virtually unshakeable in their belief in their
story." Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 6.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
197. The common lay person believes that a person under hypnosis is telling the
truth while hypnotized and what that person remembers after hypnotism is the truth.
Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 7. This belief is erroneous. See, e.g., Orne Affidavit,
supra note 103, at 7-8; Spector & Foster, supra note 73, at 577; Dilloff, supra note 81, at
22. Nevertheless, from a juror's viewpoint, a previously hypnotized witness would have
an aura of infallability which the juror would find difficult to disregard. See, e.g., TmtAL
DIPLOwMACY JOURNAL, Fall 1980, at 36.
198. Most persons when aware of their deficiencies in their recall of events, will
communicate their awareness by hesitancy, expressions of doubt, and body
language indicating lack of self-confidence. The jury relies on these indicators
of lack of certainty of recall, and their importance in the determination of the
weight of the evidence may be equal to or greater than the bare substance of
the testimony. Without adding anything substantive to the witness' memory of
events, hypnosis may significantly add to his confidence in his recall. Thus, a
witness who quite honestly reveals that he is unsure of the identification of a
defendant from a photograph . . .may, after hypnosis, become quite certain
and confident that he has picked the right man.
Diamond, supra note 16, at 339-40.
199. One article asserts that this fear ensures that a witness cannot deliberately
fabricate under hypnosis and thus ensures reliable testimony in court. See Spector &
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occurs under hypnosis is honest in the sense that the subject is
not aware that he is fabricating. Therefore, it can hardly be
expected that the usual inducements to honesty in ordinary wit-
nesses are apt to be effective for a pretrial hypnotized witness.2 00
In addition, especially in the area of criminal law, the defen-
dant's ability to present expert testimony as to the reliability of
hypnosis for jury perusal is severely cramped by the financial
costs of such testimony.
The Frye standard is the proper approach for courts to uti-
lize in the area of hypnosis. Unlike the relevancy standard, the
Frye standard focuses on the hypnosis process itself and not on
the witness's testimony. Furthermore, the other criticisms
directed at the Frye standard are not applicable to the issue of
hypnosis. For instance, the general field of experts is clinical
hypnotists who have studied its effects. The general principle to
be accepted is the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony. The way to establish general acceptance in the relevant
field is by examining expert testimony on the forensic use of
hypnosis and by examining scientific and legal literature on the
subject to see whether the use of hypnosis is widely accepted as
an accurate method of restoring memory. The only conclusion is
that hypnosis does not meet the Frye standard.
Nevertheless, three courts have found that hypnosis satisfies
the Frye standard and have admitted testimony from previously
hypnotized witnesses as substantive evidence. 02 These courts,
however, either failed to properly apply Frye20 3 or did not actu-
ally apply Frye at all.2°4 Two of these courts simply state (in
dictum) that hypnosis, as a reliable means of memory refresh-
ment, has been generally accepted in the scientific community,
and find the Frye test satisfied without any supporting material
Foster, supra note 73, at 594.
200. Diamond, supra note 16, at 330.
201. Giannelli, supra note 171, at 1243-45.
202. State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacated on other grounds,
450 U.S. 1027 (1981); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); People v. Hughes,
99 Misc. 2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1979). Since this article was written, additional cases
have implicitly or explicitly followed the approach of the Hurd court. The writer feels
these courts adopted the wrong approach. See State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d
246 (Ct. App. 1982); State v. Martin, 33 Wash. App. 486, 656 P.2d 526 (1982); State v.
Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982).
203. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). See infra notes 206-07 and
accompanying text.
204. State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Hughes, 99 Misc.
2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1979).
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demonstrating how it was satisfied.20 5 Neither court examined
scientific literature on the subject, nor heard expert testi-
mony.20 6 Ultimately, each court left the reliability of hypnosis
for the jury to weigh in evaluating witness credibility.", In effect
both courts found that hypno-induced evidence was generally
accepted among the scientific community because, ipse dixit, it
was. With this analysis, neither court actually applied Frye.
One of these courts, State v. Hurd,2 0 8 applied a version of
the Frye standard different from the one applied by the courts
in State v. Mack, State v. Mena, os 1  Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch, 208.2 and People v. Shirley. The Hurd court's ver-
sion of the Frye test read: "Scientific tests are admissible only
when they have sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and
reasonably reliable results and will contribute materially to the
ascertainment of the truth. ' 2 e It held that hypnosis satisfied
this modified Frye test.
The purpose of using hypnosis is not to obtain truth ....
Instead, hypnosis is employed as a means of overcoming amne-
sia and restoring the memory of a witness. In light of this pur-
pose, hypnosis can be considered reasonably reliable if it is
able to yield recollections as accurate as those of an ordinary
witness .... Based on the evidence submitted at trial, we are
satisfied that the use of hypnosis to refresh memory satisfies
the Frye standard in certain instances. If it is conducted prop-
erly and used only in appropriate cases, hypnosis is generally
accepted as a reasonably reliable method of restoring a per-
son's memory. Consequently, hypnotically-induced testimony
205. See supra note 204.
206. Two of those courts found testimony admissible in the face of expert testimony
stating that hypnosis was not a reliable means of eliciting accurate recall. People v.
Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646 (Onondaga County Ct. 1979); State v.
Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246, 248 (Ct. App. 1981). In essence, these courts sim-
ply followed the relevancy approach enunciated in Harding and its progeny. See supra
notes 90-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of that standard.
207. See, e.g., State v. Greer, 608 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). After stating the
assumption, "given a proper foundation for general acceptance," the court listed all
courts that have admitted hypnosis and concluded that therefore hypnosis is generally
accepted, not inherently unreliable, and that these concerns do not go to admissibility as
a matter of law, but rather go to the weight to be accorded testimony by the trier of fact.
Id. at 434-36.
208. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
208.1. 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
208.2. 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
209. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91 (citing State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343,
352, 230 A.2d 384, 389 (1967)).
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may be admissible if the proponent of the testimony can
demonstrate that the use of hypnosis in the particular case was
a reasonably reliable means of restoring memory comparable to
normal recall in its accuracy.'1"
Hurd is the only reported decision to find that hypnosis is gen-
erally accepted in the scientific community and to support its
determination with any analysis. This analysis, while persuasive,
is deficient when all available materials are studied.
The initial problem is that the Hurd court premised general
acceptance on the wrong criteria. The court assumed that hyp-
nosis is not used for reviving truthful or historically accurate
recall but only for restoring memory comparable in reliability to
ordinary recall. This premise ignores a basic fact. The only rea-
son hypnosis is used as an investigatory tool is to retrieve fac-
tual information "theoretically" stored21 1 in the subject's sub-
conscious.2 12 More importantly, such refreshed memory, whether
accurate or confabulated, is subsequently presented to the jury
as factually accurate recall. Hurd overlooks the fact that mem-
ory refreshed through hypnosis, though possibly false, is never-
theless presented as factually accurate memory. Accordingly,
the measure of general acceptance must be accuracy, not
restoration.13
Hurd sidesteps the issue of accuracy by comparing the
problems associated with hypnosis (such as vulnerability to sug-
gestion, the subject's loss of critical judgment, risk of confabula-
tion and pseudomemory, and the hypnotized witnesses' subjec-
tive assurance in the accuracy of their memory21 4) with those
problems associated with normal witness recall. 5 The court
concluded they were basically the same. "Without underesti-
mating the seriousness of the problems associated with hypnosis,
it should be recognized that psychological research concerning
210. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 537-38, 432 A.2d at 92 (citations omitted).
211. Levitt, supra note 62, at 56; see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
212. Accord People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
213. Two concurring judges in Hurd advocated this position. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J.
at 550, 432 A.2d at 98 (Sullivan and Clifford, JJ., concurring).
214. "The witness' testimony on the stand will be unshakeable; he or she has
become literally immune to cross-examination." Levitt, supra note 62, at 57. See supra
notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
215. See Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on
the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Eyewitness Identification].
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the reliability of ordinary eyewitnesses reveals similar shortcom-
ings. 1" The court's analysis, simply stated, is that if normal
witness memory is inherently fallible2 17 and courts must accept
eyewitness testimony,218  hypno-induced memory, which is
equally fallible, also will have to be accepted.2 1 9
The conclusion overlooks the critical point that normal wit-
ness memory is just that, normal witness memory. While fallible
and prone to many of the shortcomings associated with hypno-
sis, 220 the witness is testifying to something he remembers with-
out any artificial assistance or "fixing." His tainted memory is
simply the product of fallible human memory, his testimony
consisting of what he believes occurred. Hypno-induced testi-
mony, however, is categorically different. To begin with, the pre-
viously hypnotized witness testifies to something he could not
remember with normally tainted recall. The witness is not testi-
fying to what he believes he saw but rather what he remembers
under hypnosis which becomes what he believes he saw.2 21 This
testimony cannot be considered normal because it is aided by an
inherently suggestive process, hypnosis. 222 Thus, tainted normal
recall is further tainted by the process of hypnosis.
The Hurd court's reliance on "procedural safeguards" to
protect against unreliable hypno-induced testimony further
complicates matters.22s The California Supreme Court observed:
216. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
217. See Note, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 215, at 990-95.
218. "The fallibility of human memory poses a fundamental challenge to our system
of justice. Nevertheless, it is an inescapable fact of life that must be understood and
accomodated." State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 542, 432 A.2d at 95 (citations omitted).
219. "[A] rule of per se inadmissibility is unnecessarily broad and will result in
exclusion of evidence that is as trustworthy as eyewitness testimony." State v. Hurd, 86
N.J. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
220. See Note, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 215.
221. Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 8-14; Diamond, supra note 16, at 323. See
also State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980).
222. See infra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
223. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97. The six requirements were
those first proposed by Dr. Martin Orne. They are:
First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis
must conduct the session. This professional should also be able to qualify as an
expert in order to aid the court in evaluating the procedures followed.
Although we recognize that there are many other people trained to administer
hypnosis and skilled in its use for investigative purposes, we believe that a
professional must administer hypnosis if the testimony revealed is to be used
in a criminal trial. In this way, the court will be able to obtain vital informa-
tion concerning the pathological reason for memory loss and the hypno-
tizability of the witness. Furthermore, the expert will be able to conduct the
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[We] are not persuaded that the requirements adopted in
Hurd and other cases will in fact forestall each of the dangers
at which they are directed. [Also] we observe that certain dan-
gers of hypnosis are not even addressed by the Hurd require-
ments: virtually all of those rules are designed to prevent the
hypnotist from exploiting the suggestibility of the subject;
none will directly avoid the additional risks, recognized else-
where in Hurd that the subject (1) will lose his critical judg-
ment and begin to credit "memories" that were formerly
viewed as unreliable, (2) will confuse actual recall with confab-
ulation and will be unable to distinguish between the two, and
(3) will exhibit an unwarranted confidence in the validity of his
ensuing recollection. 24
Justice Mosk correctly states that even if adequate safeguards
for all the problems could be devised he doubts whether "they
could be administered in practice without injecting undue delay
interrogation in a manner most likely to yield accurate recall.
Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic session should be inde-
pendent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator or
defense. This condition will safeguard against any bias on the part of the hyp-
notist that might translate into leading questions, unintentional cues, or other
suggestive conduct.
Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement person-
nel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be recorded, either in
writing or another suitable form. This requirement will help the court deter-
mine the extent of information the hypnotist could have communicated to the
witness either directly or through suggestion.
Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain from the
subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them. The
hypnotist should carefully avoid influencing the description by asking struc-
tured questions or adding new details.
Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must be
recorded. This will establish a record of the pre-induction interview, the hyp-
notic session and the post-hypnotic period, enabling a court to determine what
information or suggestions the witness may have received during the session
and what recall was first elicited through hypnosis. The use of videotape, the
only effective record of visual cues, is strongly encouraged, but not mandatory.
Sixth, only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any
phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and the post-
hypnotic interview. Although it may be easier for a person familiar with the
investigation to conduct some of the questioning, the risk of detectable, inad-
vertent suggestion is too great, as this case illustrates. Likewise, the mere pres-
ence of such a person may influence the response of the subject.
Id.
Two New York lower courts have adopted nine prerequisites. People v. McDowell,
103 Misc. 2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1980); People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881,
427 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
224. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
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and confusion into the judicial process."22 Furthermore, he does
not need a crystal ball to predict that such procedural safe-
guards will provide "a fertile new field for litigation. ' 2 6 In his
opinion, the Hurd approach is a "game not worth the candle. ' ' 27
The Hurd court believed that these procedural safeguards
guaranteed a hypnosis process free of suggestion. That court,
like three others,2 2 8 believed these procedures could be judged
by the test for suggestibility developed in Stovall v. Denno229
and its progeny230 to insure procedures that remained suggestion
free. Under this approach, the court must "determine whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, the procedures used
were so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to the very sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. '2 3' This con-
stitutional approach, however, was not designed to deal with the
area of hypnosis.
The suggestibility standard is inappropriate for hypnosis for
a number of reasons. First, it has been extensively criticized for
offering little protection in practice against wrongful conviction
of the innocent due to mistaken identification.2 2 Also, it was
specifically designed to apply to pretrial identification proce-
dures such as lineups and showups. And "it is not quite clear
how courts would apply it to hypnosis which produces more
information than a simple identification."2 3 3 Furthermore, all
authorities agree that the hypnosis process allows the subject to
remember fact and fantasy and not even the most experienced
professional can differentiate one from the other .23  How a court
225. Id.
226. Id. at 40, 641 P.2d at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
227. Id. at 40, 641 P.2d at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
228. United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); State v. Greer,
609 N.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981);
People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1979).
229. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
230. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188
(1972). See generally C. WHrREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 353-74 (1980).
231. People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 871-73, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (1979).
232. Note, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 215, at 993. Interestingly, the
Hurd court relies extensively o'n this article for its conclusion that hypno-induced mem-
ory and normal memory art equally fallible, but the court ignores the analysis in the
article stating that the Denno suggestibility standard is unworkable and unreliable.
233. Comment, Admissibility of Testimony, supra note 27, at 1219.
234. See Orne Affidavit, supra note 103; Diamond, supra note 16; Dilloff, supra note
81; Spector & Foster, supra note 73. See also People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d
775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982); State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226,
624 P.2d 1274 (1981); People v. Bicknell, 114 Cal. App. 3d 388 (1980)(available on
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will determine when the process is free of suggestion is a ques-
tion that remains unanswered."3 5
Secondly, the standard places a heavy burden on the defen-
dant to prove that the process was inherently suggestive.'
Excepting the most flagrant cases of suggestion,37 the defendant
will be unable to meet this burden.238 Whether the hypnosis pro-
cess was suggestive will boil down to experts for each side testi-
fying as to the suggestiveness of the individual process. The
judiciary is ill-equipped to determine for itself if any individual
hypnosis process is inherently suggestive'3 ' and will ultimately
be forced routinely to admit hypno-induced testimony'40 and
leave the matter to the trier of fact as an issue of credibility.'4 1
LEXIS, States library, Cal. file), hearing granted, Crim. 21582, Cal. (Feb. 11, 1981); Peo-
ple v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
1764 (Minn. 1980); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
235. The safeguards that are proposed for pretrial hypnosis, such as videotaping the
hypnotism process or allowing only professional hypnotists to perform the process, see
State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 540-42, 432 A.2d at 94; State v. Martin, 33 Wash. App. 486, 656
P.2d 526 (1982), are useful in the sense that they may prevent overt suggestion on the
part of the hypnotists from influencing the subject. However, no procedural safeguards
exist or have been suggested that can protect against the inherent suggestiveness of the
process. See Orne Affidavit, supra note 103; Diamond, supra note 16, at 332-34, 348-49.
236. United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 279-82 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
237. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 525, 432 A.2d at 86.
238. See, e.g., United States v. Narciso, 466 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
239. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 39 n.24, 641 P.2d at 787 n.24, 181 Cal. Rptr.
at 255 n.24.
240. As guidelines for use of hypnosis are established by law enforcement agencies,
see, e.g., Ault, Hypnosis: The F.B.I.'s Team Approach, F.B.I. LAw ENFORCMErNT BuLL.,
Jan. 1980, 7-8 (checklist for agents to use before any hypnotic session with a potential
witness), compliance with such procedures will become a routine matter. The judiciary,
like professionals unable to look beyond the actual hypnotic process for suggestion,
would be relegated to the role of checking hypnotism sessions for procedural inconsisten-
cies and routinely admitting all procedurally error-free sessions.
241. In effect the use of hypnosis would become a battle of the experts; diametri-
cally opposed experts would testify for each side as to the reliability of the hypnotic
process. The court, unable by itself to determine which expert is right, will be forced to
leave the issue to the jury. This in fact is exactly what has occurred. In United States v.
Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977), experts testified for each side, and each
side's experts agreed that the other side may be right. The court stated:
The experts testify that any alternative is possible [accuracy or confabula-
tion] . . . but that one or the other theory is more probable. Weighing this
testimony... the court cannot conclude that the hypnotic interrogation ses-
sion together with the photographic array creates a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification .... The court recognizes that there is a possi-
bility of misidentification in the circumstances.... On these facts where the
probabilities are closely in equipoise, the court will not remove from the jury
the function of finding the facts.
Id. at 281-82 (emphasis added).
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Lastly, while both hypnosis and lineups can be conducted in
a suggestive manner, a lineup in and of itself is not an inherently
suggestive process. Hypnotism is. Two important characteristics
of a subject in a hypnotic state are hypersuggestiveness and
hypercompliance2 i Hypnosis has been defined as an alteration
in consciousness and concentration in which the subject
manifests a heightened degree of suggestibility.2 43 The subject's
increased compliance stems from the feeling of a close relation-
ship promoted by the hypnotist to ensure cooperation.2 44 It is a
cooperative effort in which the therapist aids the subject by
means of a specialized knowledge and technique to achieve a
purpose which both have agreed upon as valid and worth-
while.2 4 It must be remembered that the typical witness will be
hypnotized after interviews by police authorities. The purpose of
the hypnosis is the noble and worthwhile goal of remembering
forgotten facts about the crime to which one has been exposed.
To fully appreciate the problems which may follow a hypnotic
session, it is necessary to recognize the scientific fact that a
deeply hypnotized individual who is asked to remember and
describe something which occurred while he was asleep or not
actually present almost always produces something which
appears to be memory. 46
Similarly a hypnotized witness will invariably remember some
facts under hypnosis, and even in the most suggestion-free envi-
ronment there is no guarantee that such memories are fact and
not fantasy. Thus, Hurd's procedural safeguards and the
Stovall suggestibility standard fail as useful tools in the area of
hypnosis. The California Supreme Court correctly concluded:
"For all these reasons we join instead a growing number of
courts that have abandoned any pretense of devising workable
Leaving the decision to the jury is little more than an abdication of judicial respon-
sibility because the jury is in an even worse position than the judiciary to gauge the
reliability of hypno-induced testimony.
242. Levitt, supra note 62, at 56.
243. Spector & Foster, supra note 73, at 570.
244. See, Note, Safeguards Against Suggestiveness: A Means For Admissibility of
Hypno-Induced Testimony, 38 WASH. & LEz L. Rav. 197, 200 (1981). See also Common-
wealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981). "A subject's awareness of the
purpose of the hypnotic session, coupled with the hypersuggestibility which the subject
experiences, amounts to a situation fraught with unreliability." Id. at 104, 436 A.2d at
174.
245. Spector & Foster, supra note 73, at 571.
246. Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 23; Diamond, supra note 16, at 335.
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'safeguards' and have simply held that hypnotically induced tes-
timony is so widely viewed as unreliable that it is inadmissible
under the Frye test." 4"
IV. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
This writer is not alone in believing that the heart of sixth
amendment confrontation"" is cross-examination.2 4  Cross-
examination involves face to face confrontation: two opponents
meeting in a judicial setting, each advocating different theories
and facts explaining the event in dispute. Typically, confronta-
tion problems have arisen in the context of hearsay declarations
offered as substantive evidence at a criminal trial.2 50 Within the
various factual settings, the question has been whether to admit
a witness's prior statements as substantive evidence against a
defendant even though the declarant is unavailable for cross-
examination at trial.2 51 Because of the inherent difficulties
attendant to cross-examining witnesses who have undergone
hypnosis, a novel and disturbing question arises: in the context
of a criminal proceeding, is a defendant deprived of his sixth
247. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 40, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 256,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
248. The sixth amendment states in part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right. .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The right to confrontation has been held applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403
(1965). There are numerous scholarly critiques of the Supreme Court's analysis and
approach to the confrontation area. See, e.g., Graham, The Confrontation Clause, The
Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 Tax. L. REV. 151 (1978); Graham, The
Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8
CRiM. L. BULL. 99 (1972). The purpose of this section is to explore confrontation within
the context of previously hynotized witnesses. Absent a strict application of the Frye
rule, this writer contends that sixth amendment confrontation rights are compromised
by hypnosis.
249. 5 J. WIGMoIW, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 158. (Chadbourn rev. 1974). Many Supreme
Court opinions in the past equate confrontation with cross-examination. See, e.g., Rob-
erts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1 (1966); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
250. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
Confrontation issues have also arisen in cases where a witness refuses to answer ques-
tions concerning prior statements, Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); and where
the witness at trial claims a faulty memory regarding prior statements, California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
251. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204
(1972); cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (witness physically present at trial,
but "unavailable" due to loss of memory).
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amendment right to confront a witness who has been hypnotized
for the ostensible purpose of effecting better recall? In address-
ing this question, it is necessary to discuss the underlying pur-
poses behind the clause itself and the conduct it protects
against."'
In California v. Green, the Supreme Court identified the
backbone of the confrontation clause:
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his state-
ments under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness
of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of
a penalty of perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-
examination, the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth;" (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in
making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his
credibility.2 58
If "the mission of the confrontation clause is to advance a prac-
tical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining pro-
cess,"2 5 then the adversary system must provide the defendant"an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. 2 55
252. For an excellent historical guide to confrontation, see F. Hau.L, THE SixrH
AMENDMENT 10 (1951). See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
253. California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 J. WIMooE, EVIDENCE § 1367
(3rd ed. 1940)).
254. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
255. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 407. A major concern in the context of pre-trial
hypnosis is what "opportunity to cross-examine" means. Recent Supreme Court deci-
sions seem to suggest that if a witness testifies at trial, confrontation is satisfied. In
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), a witness made statements to a police officer
and later testified at a preliminary hearing that the defendant was his drug supplier. At
trial, however, the witness could only "guess" if Green was his drug supplier even after
the prosecution refreshed his memory with his prior statements. The Supreme Court
decided that defendant had adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the
preliminary hearing where the witness was under oath and defendant was represented by
counsel. The witness's prior statements were admitted into evidence even though he
could not remember at trial. Furthermore, the witness appeared at trial and was sub-
jected to the three main aspects of confrontation: oath, cross-examination, and jury
perusal. Thus, "the inability to cross-examine the witness at the time he made his prior
statement cannot be easily shown to be of crucial significance as long as the defendant is
assured of full and effective cross-examination at the time of the trial." Id. at 159. The
witness, however, was examined by defendant at the preliminary hearing. Similarly, in
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Supreme Court approved admission of a key
witness's prior statement against the defendant. The witness had disappeared and was
unavailable for trial. At a preliminary hearing, however, the witness was examined by
defendant in an attempt to elicit favorable testimony. The Supreme Court held that
defendant's examination of the witness at the preliminary hearing "clearly partook of
cross-examination as a matter of form." Id. at 70. In addition, counsel's questioning corn-
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In sum, confrontation envisions
a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether
he is worthy of belief.2
The Supreme Court has developed general guidelines to be
utilized when confrontation problems arise. These guidelines,
however, have been developed through a line of cases almost
exclusively concerned with hearsay problems. 7 In these cases,
the witness is not available at trial, and the prosecution seeks to
introduce a prior statement made by the absent witness. But in
the case of hypnosis these guidelines provide little aid in analyz-
ing whether a defendant's confrontation rights are violated
because the hypnotized witness testifies at trial. 258 The witness
ported with the principal purpose of cross-examination: to challenge "whether the
declarant was sincerely telling what he believed to be the truth, whether the declarant
accurately perceived and remembered the matter he related, and whether the declarant's
intended meaning is adequately conveyed by the language he employed." Id. at 71
(quoting Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 H~Av. L. REv. 1378 (1972)). The
court refused to decide whether "mere opportunity" to cross-examine a witness is
enough to admit prior testimony. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70.
Both Green and Roberts implicitly operate upon two crucial assumptions: (1) when
examination of the witness occurred at the preliminary stage of a trial, there was oppor-
tunity to "test" the memory of the witness before he forgot or disappeared, and (2)
because the witness was examined as to his initial perceptions, memory, attitudes, and
sincerity, defendant in fact had fair and adequate opportunity to cross-examine.
These assumptions, however, fail in the hypnosis cases. Once hypnotized, a defen-
dant loses all opportunity to cross-examine the original witness. The original witness's
initial perceptions and memory are crucial, but are lost to the hypnotic process. Most
frightening is that a witness will not even suspect this and will usually assume his "new"
memory is real, accurate, and truthful. See Diamond, supra note 16, at 333. Thus, Green
and Roberts are premised not only upon opportunity to cross-examine, but in both cases
upon defendant's actually taking advantage of that opportunity at a preliminary hearing.
256. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242-43 (1895)).
257. Id. at 62-66. Most recently in Roberts, the Supreme Court decided that con-
frontation means necessity: the necessity to produce a witness against a defendant at
trial. If the witness is unavailable at trial, the prosecution bears the burden of establish-
ing that the state has made a good faith effort to procure the witness's presence. Even
after these requirements are met, a court must still determine whether the statements
bear "adequate indicia of reliability" or "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Id. at 65-66.
258. In State v. Mack, defendant argued that the hypnotically induced "memory" in
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is subjected to an oath-taking and cross-examination in a formal
setting, and the demeanor and countenance of the witness are
open to perusal by the jury. There is, in fact, face-to-face con-
frontation. Nonetheless, several confrontation problems still
exist.
First, the practical purpose of the oath (or affirmation) cere-
mony is to impress upon the witness the duty to testify truth-
fully.2 9 The oath, at one time, was regarded as "a summoning of
divine vengeance upon false swearing."260 Today, however, it is
viewed as a mode of "reminding the witness strongly of the
divine punishment somewhere in store for false swearing, and
thus putting him in a frame of mind calculated to speak only the
truth as he saw it."' 261 The perjury penalty operates in a similar
manner. The witness is cautioned against conscious falsification.
The oath reminds him of "ultimate punishment by a supernatu-
ral power, '26 2 while the penalty of perjury reminds him of"speedy punishment by a temporal power."2 6 3 Dean Wigmore
found the combination of affirmation with the penalty of perjury
to be a real and powerful prophylactic device preventing false
witness.26" Thus, the special feature underlying the oath or affir-
mation is that it operates in advance of the admission of evi-
dence; it is an "expedient calculated to supply an antidote or a
prophylactic for the supposed weakness or danger inherent in
the evidence. 26e 5 Thus, an oath-taking ceremony, if anything,
strongly cautions a witness against knowingly testifying to false
that case, violated his right to confrontation and cross-examination. State v. Mack, 292
N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. 1980). Though Mack does not expressly so hold, the court did
recognize that a memory after hypnosis becomes so firmly rooted "that the ordinary
'indicia of reliability' are completely erased." Id. at 769. The court also noted that
"because the person hypnotized is subjectively convinced of the veracity of the 'memory,'
this recall is not susceptible to attack by cross-examination." Id. at 770. The Mack court
did not rule on the confrontation issue raised because the "proffered testimony does not
meet ordinary standards of reliability for admission." Id. at 772. Presumably the offered
testimony could not satisfy the Frye test requirement of general acceptance in the scien-
tific community.
259. See, e.g., Flores v. State, 443 P.2d 73, 76-77 (Alaska 1968); Clinton v. State, 33
Ohio St. 27, 33 (1877); FED. R. EVID. 603; 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1817, 1819
(Chadbourn rev. 1976).
260. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 259, § 1816.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. § 1831.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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statements."'
Hypnosis, however, destroys this prophylactic function.
After hypnosis, neither subject nor expert observer is able to dis-
tinguish between confabulations and accurate recall in any given
case absent corroborating evidence.267 In fact, witnesses who
may have been unsure about a set of events may become abso-
lutely certain after hypnosis.268 Thus, after hypnosis, a witness
cannot knowingly testify to a falsehood because the witness is
unable to separate truth from falsehood.2 6 9 The witness claims
only one thing: a "new" memory. What is remembered may be
either accurate or inaccurate, but the witness cannot know
which, and thus by definition can never knowingly perjure him-
self. Through hypnosis, the oath-taking purpose underlying con-
frontation is effectively neutralized.
Second, effective cross-examination is seriously impeded
and in many cases rendered altogether meaningless. Orne states
that a hypnotized subject will tend to mix past knowledge or
other factual information gathered from newspaper accounts,
prior interrogatories, and inadvertent comments made by others
with his own memory. Under hypnosis, these bits of knowledge
become fused to form pseudomemories. 7 0 The witness's original
memories, attitudes, perceptions, and sincerity are lost to the
hypnotic process and, therefore, it is impossible upon cross-
examination to sort out which facts the witness knew prior to
hypnosis, discovered during hypnosis, or learned after hypno-
266. See generally, 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 259 at §§ 1816-29.
267. Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 11, Diamond, supra note 16, at 337. "It must
be emphasized that there is no known way of distinguishing with certainty between
actual recall and pseudomemories except by independent verification." Quoted in a reso-
lution passed, in October, 1978, by the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis,
and in August, 1979, by the International Society of Hypnosis, 27 INT'L J. oF CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNosis 452, 453 (1979).
268. Dr. Orne, noting an increasing use of hypnosis by the police to create more
trustworthy witnesses, testified that
[t]ypically, when a witness is a bad witness . . . you hypnotize [him] because
. . . the story goes all over the place every time he's asked something differ-
ent-once you hypnotize [him], he consensually validates the story, and at that
point it's fixed . . . . (Ylou can take somebody who is a terribly bad witness
and make [him] a very good witness, because you . . . convinced [him] not
only of the reality, but that you believe in the reality, and as a consequence
[he] become[s] [an] unshakeable witness and that is a profound danger.
State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 769 n.10 (quoting Dr. Orne).
269. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
270. Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 14, 15. Diamond confirms this disturbing
phenomonon. Diamond, supra note 16, at 333-36.
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sis. 271 If hypnosis can have "the effect of radically altering the
nature of a witness ,' 272 can it be fairly asserted that there is ade-
quate opportunity to cross-examine a hypnotized witness at
trial? Should opportunity to cross-examine be interpreted in
light of the reality that hypnosis is concededly used to change,
in some way, a witness's memory? 23 The right to cross-examine"seems to involve the most basic right of an individual to con-
front his accuser without having to be concerned that the
accuser's mind has wittingly or unwittingly been altered by spe-
cial procedures not well understood by the public at large. 2 7 4
Without an opportunity to cross-examine the witness prior to
hypnosis, the second major purpose of confrontation 2 7  is also
neutralized. "The greatest legal engine ever invented for the dis-
271. See supra notes 268-69.
272. Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 22.
273. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 231, 624 P.2d 1274, 1279 (1981).
274. Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 24. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641
P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rtpr. 243, cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 133 (1982). Shirley did not need to
critically address this issue because the state did not satisfy the Frye standard. The
State of California, however, may choose to retry Mr. Shirley for the same alleged
offenses. But, by excluding the hypnotic testimony of the victim, Shirley will not have to
face at trial the hypnotized victim, at least concerning matters related to the hypnosis.
Prior to her being hypnotized, she did testify at a preliminary hearing. Because she is
now disqualified from testifying to the events, she becomes unavailable as a witness
within the meaning of the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 71 n.60,
641 P.2d at 808 n.60, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 276 n.60. Her original story, prior to the hypnosis,
was given in a preliminary hearing where "defendant had the 'right and opportunity' to
cross-examine her" and thus, to exclude her testimony altogetheb he must show her
"disqualification as a witness was brought about by the procurement or wrongdoing of
the proponent of [her] statement," i.e., the state. Id. If Mr. Shirley cannot satisfy this
burden, then he may be retried. The witness "against him" will be the preliminary hear-
ing testimony of the victim. In effect, it is the Green and Roberts dilemma in toto. It is,
however, the correct approach, as the majority returns Shirley to the position he would
have been in absent the unreliable hypnotic testimony. Thus, Shirley is not forced to
face a witness who may have been drastically altered by the hypnotic process, and there-
fore confrontation is satisfied. Moreover, since Green defense attorneys have been on
notice to effectively utilize cross-examination at the preliminary hearings, if they fail to
do so, they may lose their only "opportunity." A case in point arises where a witness who
testified at a preliminary hearing dies prior to trial. But consider the case where a wit-
ness testifies to a small portion of an event at a preliminary hearing, defendant cross-
examines, and later, the witness is hypnotized prior to trial. Here, the defendant's right
to confrontation is seriously compromised and that witness should not be permitted to
testify. Again, as in Shirley, the prior testimony would be admissible. But the subse-
quent hypnosis contaminates the witness and in many cases is tantamount to tampering
with evidence. See Diamond, supra note 16, at 314.
For an outrageous example of the use of the former testimony exception to the hear-
say rule, see State v. Williams, 9 Wash. App. 663, 513 P.2d 1045 (1973), rev'd, 84 Wash.
2d 853, 529 P.2d 1088 (1975).
275. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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covery of truth"276 is effectively derailed.
The third and perhaps most troubling aspect of hypnosis
concerns jury observation. A crucial matter in all cases is
whether a jury will believe and trust the witness offering testi-
mony. The jury's decision may rest upon a witness's demeanor,
memory, sincerity, certainty, and convictions. In many cases, the
believability of a particular witness may determine the outcome
of a criminal proceeding. But "a witness who is uncertain about
a set of events, with hypnosis, can be helped to have absolute
subjective conviction about what happened. ' 7 7  In some
instances, the content remembered through the hypnotic process
will remain the same. But the subjective conviction of the wit-
ness is usually entirely different after the hypnotic process 2 78
The subject may have a strong subjective confidence in the
validity of his new memory, making it impossible for an expert
or jury to critically assess the credibility of the witness's mem-
ory.2 7' If scientists and experts agree that they can only specu-
late as to the validity of the "recalled" memory without cor-
roborating evidence, 8 can we expect juries to fare any better if
the experts themselves cannot tell? Can a jury critically assess
the demeanor of a witness who has a "strong subjective confi-
dence" in the accuracy of his new memory? Professor Diamond
does not think so:
A subject who has lost the memory of the source of his learned
information will assume that the memory is spontaneous to his
own experience. Such a belief can be unshakeable, last a life-
time, and be immune to all cross-examination. It is especially
prone to "freeze" if it is compatible with the subject's prior
prejudices, beliefs, or desires. This type of distorted memory is
very apt to appear genuine and spontaneous, and will be
unlikely to disappear.'8
Thus, in most cases the third purpose of confrontation is under-
mined after hypnosis. A few courts, though, have recently begun
276. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
277. Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 11. See generally Dr. Orne's discussion of the
Bicknell case. Id. at 19-23. See also Diamond, supra note 16, at 336; Levitt, supra note
62, at 57.
278. Orne Affidavit, supra note 103, at 22; Diamond, supra note 16, at 339, 340. See
supra note 267.
279, Diamond, supra note 16, at 333, 336.
280. See supra notes 234, 267.
281. Diamond, supra note 16, at 336.
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to take notice of the seriousness of the confrontation problems.
In State v. Mena, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that
cross-examination is absolutely essential to the protection of a
defendant's rights and is a "vital part of the federal constitu-
tional right to confrontation."' 2 In State v. Mack, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court noted that hypnosis erases the "ordinary
indicia of reliability" and hypnotic subjects have been able to
pass lie detector tests while attesting to facts which researchers
knew were false.28 3 "It would be impossible to cross-examine
such a witness in any meaningful way. 2 84 In State v. Bicknell,
the court held that testimony which is partially the product of
hypnosis violates the confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment because the witness cannot be cross-examined on the
details of the hypnosis. There the witness was unable to know
the details of the process "by definition-because she had -been
under hypnosis. "285
Hypno-induced testimony violates a defendant's right to
confront the witnesses against him. Moreover, the confrontation
problem is a separate issue. Thus, even assuming the Frye28 6
standard can be satisfied sometime in the future, courts must
still consider whether the three major purposes underlying con-
frontation are satisfied. If these goals of confrontation are suffi-
ciently frustrated even when the Frye standard is met, then the
testimony still must be excluded upon constitutional grounds.
V. CONCLUSION
It is by now quite clear that testimony elicited from wit-
nesses regarding events discussed while the witness was hypno-
tized is extremely likely to be fantasy-confabulation. One can-
282. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981).
283. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980); see State v. Bicknell, 114
Cal. App. 3d 388 (1980)(available on LEXIS, States library, Cal. file), hearing granted,
Crim. 21582, Cal. (Feb. 11, 1981).
284. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 769.
285. State v. Bicknell, 114 Cal. App. 3d 388 (1980) (available on LEXIS, States
Library, Cal. file), hearing granted, Crim. 21582, Cal. (Feb. 11, 1981). The court refused
to adopt any precautionary procedures designed to limit the potentials for abuse. Id.
"The abuse is in the admission of incompetent testimony, not in the procedures
employed in preparing it." Id.
286. Of course, if the proponent of the hypno-induced testimony cannot satisfy
Frye, there is no confrontation problem because the testimony is excluded. It is unclear
at this point whether satisfying Frye will also cure the confrontation problems. In any
event, those courts who have not yet accepted Frye must still face the confrontation
problems hypnosis creates.
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not say with certainty that hypnosis cannot accurately restore
true repressed memory.2 87 In some cases, no doubt, lie detection,
truth serum, and witchcraft, also work. Perhaps the reading of
duck entrails works. But how can the results of hypnosis be vali-
dated? The Hurd court attempted to validate the results by
videotaping hypnotic sessions28 The stated purpose was to
enable the trial court to determine what "cues" the hypnotist
may have conveyed to the subject. Yet the same court acknowl-
edges: "Because of the unpredictability of what will influence a
subject, it is difficult even for an expert examining a videotape
of a hypnotic session to identify possible cues. ' 289 If experts can-
not make such determinations, it is vain to imagine that judges
or jurors can do so.
The Hurd rules are intended to prevent the hypnotist from
exploiting the witness's suggestibility. The procedure does not
address the problems that the witness will lose his critical judg-
ment under hypnosis, turning what he had considered unreliable
memory into certain recollection; that he will confuse actual
recall with information secured from other sources, creating a
logical, but false, whole; and that he will evince an unjustifiable
confidence in the validity of his ensuing supposed "recollection."
Finally, the "safeguards" would produce enormous delay, confu-
sion, and expense. They also would produce future litigation.2 9
Hypnotically refreshed testimony is so widely viewed as
unreliable by the most recent decisions and by the most reputa-
ble experts in the field that such testimony cannot meet the
Frye standard. In the jurisdictions which follow the "relevancy"
rule, hypnotism is so unreliable as to be excludable there as well.
After all, if witnesses are not suffered to testify under hypnosis
in open court, why should they be allowed to "refresh" their
memories in this fashion out of court? It is true, that the state
may see itself in a difficult position: should it subject the witness
to hypnotism as an investigatory tool and lose him as a witness
at trial or use his unhypnotized but weak testimony at a crimi-
287. Several alleged examples are found in H. CRASILNECK & J. HALL, CLINICAL HYP-
NOSIS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 228, 230, 233 (1975). This book itself, however, is
instructive in its emphasis. Ninety-eight percent of the book deals with functions of hyp-
nosis other than restoration of memory.
288. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 547-48, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981).
289. Id. at 538-39, 432 A.2d at 93.
290. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
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nal trial? One possible answer would be to preserve the"prehypnotic memory" in a deposition.2 91
In recent years there has been some tendency in some juris-
dictions to whittle down the Frye standard for reception of sci-
entific evidence.92 This study, it is hoped, may cast doubt on
the soundness of such development.
Hypnotizing a witness is not like "any other method" of
refreshing a witness's recollection. It is not like a song or a scent.
The technique of hypnosis does much more than permit the wit-
ness to recover repressed actual memories; it actively serves to
erect fantasies, creates in the subject an abiding belief in their
truth, and makes it impossible for the trier of fact to distinguish
between the two. If the testimony is only as reliable as the tech-
nique, it must be judged by the same standard of admissibility.
Finally, the hypnotized witness's conviction of absolute veracity
of his hypnotically induced recollection waxes in strength each
time he is asked to repeat his story. At the time of trial, the"memory" is highly likely to be so firmly implanted that he is
immune to cross-examination.2 93
The Arizona, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania courts pointed
the way to what at first blush is somewhat radical but on full
analysis becomes inevitable. The superb opinion of Justice Stan-
ley Mosk of the California Supreme Court in People v. Shirley
applied the last touches. A new rule of incompetence must now
be added to the textbooks.
291. See State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232 n.1, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 n.1 (1981). What
if the subject, while under hypnosis, makes an exculpatory statement? The rule of exclu-
sion would work singularly unjustly in that case. Perhaps the rule of exclusion would in
such a case offend the due process clause.
292. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A
Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 261
(1981). Cf. FED. R. EVID. 402.
293. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 16, at 339; authorities cited by Justice Mosk in
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 18-77, 641 P.2d 775-812, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243-80. For an
analysis in an analogous situation see Beaver & Biggs, Attending Witnesses' Prior Dec-
larations as Evidence: Theory v. Reality, 3 IND. LEG. FOR. 309 (1970).
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